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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper centres on a consideration of the ‘Proudly South Africa’ campaign and whether it 
is compliant with the general operations of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the 
National Treatment Policy in terms of Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). By extension, this research questions the relationship between trade and competition 
in the international context and the shortfall therein. The current method of competition 
regulation in the form of national competition legislation and policies, and bilateral competition 
agreements, is proving insubstantial, and susceptible to inconsistency, due to the overlap in 
regulation. Therefore, a single regulatory body is necessary to ensure uniformity.   
The GATT expanded from its formative years of 23 signatories, to its evolution into the WTO, 
the de facto global trade organisation, boasting a membership of 164 countries. This research 
essentially considers whether the WTO can replicate its success under the GATT and, in turn, 
act as the pinnacle of a world competition organisation or forum, given the overlap in nature 
between trade and competition.  
By discussing, how developing countries are affected by the lack of uniformity where 
competition regulation is concerned and whether the WTO’s intention to promote international 
trade and competition has had the converse effect of hindering competition by limiting market 
access. Further, whether such obligations have proved too restrictive on developing and least 
developed member states, this research considers the role of the WTO in developing a 
competition regime, and whether there is potential for such a body to be created in a similar 
vein to that of the development of the WTO. The proposal of this research is that the 
involvement of the WTO is integral, both from the perspective of its ability to rally its members, 
and to ensure there is no conflict between the two prospective international bodies. However, 
in order to ensure competition remains at the focus of this establishment, and is not over 
shadowed by trade requirements, and to ensure developing countries’ needs are taken into 
account, the WTO should play more of an advisory role, than act as the dominating body.  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND: 
 
In broad, this paper considers the practical effect Article III (commonly referred to as the 
National Treatment Policy) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GATT)1, has on 
the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) Member states. More specifically, this paper questions 
whether the Article has in actuality encouraged or hindered competitive trade. The ‘Proudly 
South African’ campaign will be the starting point of this topic. The key matters for 
consideration are:  
i) whether such a logo amounts to an infringement of South Africa’s obligation to 
the WTO Agreements2 not to offer different treatment of its own products to 
those like products introduced into its market by other Member states; and  
ii) whether the Article, instead of realising its intended effect of encouraging well-
regulated trade, too greatly burdens the development of necessary competitive 
capacity in lesser developed Members, like South Africa. 
Thus, the paper looks at whether the effect of some WTO obligations are too restrictive in the 
context of a developing member state, relying on the Proudly South African campaign as a 
specific point of analysis. The relevant Article itself is fairly lengthy, but it surmises that WTO 
Member states owe other Member states an obligation to treat foreign imported products as 
they would their own like products once imported into the Member states’ market. Further, 
Paragraph 4 of the Article more specifically addresses treatment that must be ‘no less 
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, 
regulations and requirements’.3 Such requirements include marking details, which, other than 
place of origin markings, such markings cannot result in a differentiation between domestic 
and imported goods. The basis of Article III is that, other than marking the country of origin on 
the product, no marking should appear that distinguishes an imported product from a domestic 
                                                          
1 GATT 1994:General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) 
[hereinafter GATT 1994]. 
2 WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement or WTO Agreement]. 
3 Article III of the GATT 1994. 
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product and affords the domestic product an ‘unfair’ competitive advantage, as this would then 
amount to an infringement of the Member state’s WTO obligation. 
According to the WTO itself, ‘Its main function is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, 
predictably and freely as possible’ and ‘to open trade to the benefit of all’.4 In essence, the 
purpose of the WTO is to facilitate and promote trade between its Member states. However, 
one wonders whether such restrictions are not causing an adverse effect instead. To 
determine this, the point of reference would be understanding what is being intended with the 
use of the ‘Proudly South African’ logo. The answer seems fairly obvious- to promote local 
production and consumption. As stated on the Proudly South African site, the aim is to 
‘encourage consumers to source local products, which in turn would influence the private 
sector to source resources locally, including labour and manufacturing’.5 Ultimately, the 
campaign seeks to inspire local job creation, to decrease unemployment and to introduce 
money back into the South African economy.6 For a product to qualify under the campaign, 
“[…] at least 50% of the cost of production must be incurred in South Africa and there must be 
“substantial transformation” of any imported materials.”7  
If an economy such as South Africa’s stands to benefit from a campaign such as the 
aforementioned, then surely its implementation should be endorsed. Thus, the consideration 
is whether such a stringent obligation is not, in fact, having a regressive or stagnant effect on 
developing the country’s economy as it forces compliance with a provision that negates the 
promotion of local consumption. Note that this research will not be considering restrictive trade 
or even whether developing countries benefit from the WTO extensively. Rather, it intends to 
incorporate that consideration without making it the focal point 
By considering the logo, this research instead intends developing into discerning legitimate 
marketing practices and competitive tools in the face of Articles such as the National 
Treatment Policy. Do these, possibly, qualify as exemptions? The WTO, in its supposed effort 
to encourage developing countries to partake in international trade and competition, while 
bearing in mind their impediments resultant of their weaker economies and international 
influence, allows for certain concessions where developing and least developed countries are 
                                                          
4‘The WTO… In brief’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr00_e.htm, accessed on 17 June 2019. 
5 ‘About the Campaign – Overview’ available at 
http://members.proudlysa.co.za/section/about.asp?include=../area/about_us/about.html&title=../gfx/pa
ges/about.jpg, accessed on 17 June 2019. 
6 ‘Welcome to the home of buy local’ http://www.proudlysa.co.za/consumer-site/consumer.html, 
accessed on 17 June 2019. Importantly, in 2018, South Africa unemployment rate was at 27%. 
www.statssa.gov.za, accessed 10 July 2019. 
7 ‘Logo Identification – Local Content’ available at http://www.proudlysa.co.za/consumer-
site/consumer.html, accessed on 17 June 2019. 
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concerned. These include provisions found in WTO agreements, such as the GATT and the 
GATS8  whereby the developed Member states are encouraged to treat developing and least 
developed Member states with leniency.9 The section dealing with Trade and Development in 
the GATT10 includes provisions on non-reciprocity between developed and developing 
countries, meaning the trade concessions granted by a developed Member state to a non-
developed Member state need not be returned. Non-developed Member states are also 
granted some general allowances, including more time to incorporate WTO provisions into 
their existing national legislation, greater market access in certain key trade industries, such 
as textiles, services etc., and various means of financial and resource support for non-
developed Member states to realise their WTO obligations. However, none of these 
concessions appear to allow any Member state, whether developed or not, to abandon their 
WTO obligations. Thus, if the National Treatment Policy is deemed a core principle, there is 
the possibility that, through the Proudly South African campaign, South Africa is, in fact, failing 
to adhere to the WTO standard, without exemption. If the campaign is potentially WTO non-
compliant, another pertinent matter that needs to be addressed is whether it complies with the 
general standard of international competition practices and the extent to which this can be 
reconciled with the international trade practices.  
It is apparent that an interplay exists between trade and competition as trade encompasses a 
competitive element. However, this does not mean the two are one and the same. This means 
that, when interpreting trade or competition legislation, it is likely that it would need to be read 
with the other.  Further, international trade is regulated by the WTO, and the provisions of the 
GATT, by their nature, promote trade and, with that, competition.11 However, the same cannot 
be said for international competition.  
This research will identify that there is no single body regulating anti-competitive practices 
internationally. Instead, the method of regulation appears to be co-operation amongst different 
foreign jurisdictions.12 This poses an obvious problem of potential overlap or conflicting laws 
and bears the question of which jurisdiction would take precedence in such instances. 
However, the rationale behind the slow implementation of an international policy and 
regulatory body is that the regulation of competition within countries is fairly new, with a surge 
                                                          
8 General Agreement on Trade in Services: General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 
I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. 
9 ‘Understanding the WTO: Developing countries’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/dev1_e.htm, accessed on 17 June 2019. 
10 Part IV 4 of GATT 1947.  
11 S Woolcock ‘International Competition Policy and the World Trade Organisation’ 2010 LSE 
Business Council Trade Forum in South Africa at 2. 
12 C Oh ‘Trade and Competition Policy in the WTO’ (2003) 18 Third World Network (TWN) for Cancun 
at 2. 
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in policies only being enacted within the last 20 years.13 However, the idea of a “World 
Competition Organisation”, so to speak, is not new and a number of authors have made 
contributions pertaining to the need for a single ordinance and the challenges likely to be faced 
in efforts to develop an international competition policy. What is most striking is the arguments 
on the WTO’s role in this development and that will form the particular focus of this research 
paper. 
In summary, this research has, over the course, developed from a consideration of the 
‘Proudly South Africa’ campaign and whether it is WTO compliant to whether it is, in fact, 
compliant with international trade standards. On this basis, the key research questions have 
developed to encompass the relationship between trade and competition; the shortfall in the 
regulation of international competition; and how countries, like South Africa, are affected by 
this.  
 
1.2 OVERVIEW 
 
It is futile to argue that competition is not essential to the operation of trade. In its attempts to 
encourage international trade and promote free trade areas, the WTO asserts that an increase 
in global competition will inherently manifest from a boost in trade. The expectation is that this 
will lead to a surge in exports as countries capitalize on their comparative specialization and 
lower, alternatively dispense with, tariff barriers.14 For consumers, the benefits are substantial, 
as it will ensure market accountability- production costs will be lowered; goods will be 
produced at a better quality; production will be more efficient and, as a result of exposure to 
new ideas, manufacturers will become more innovative.15 Ultimately, competition is necessary 
to hold suppliers to an elevated standard. Where production increases, naturally job creation 
manifests as a result. Through competition, global trade can then aid in profitability, particularly 
for disadvantaged regions. When properly effected, it can be used to boost a country’s 
economy, which, for developing countries, means less reliance on foreign aid. As such, a 
                                                          
13 B Hoekman and PS Holmes ‘Competition, Developing Countries and the WTO’ (1999) 22(6) The 
World Economy at 876.  
14 ‘Investment and Competition: What role for the WTO?’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey3_e.htm#investment, accessed on 17 June 
2019. 
15 ‘Consumers, Multilateral Competition Policy and the WTO: Technical Report’ 2003 Consumers 
International at 10 available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/symp03_ci_tech_report_e.pdf, accessed on 01 July 2019. 
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monitored competitive discipline is necessary to keep existing competitors in line and also to 
facilitate foreign direct investment in emerging markets.16 
This, however, is simply a surface level account of how trade and competition result in 
improved economies, and those in support of globalization and the purpose of the WTO 
strongly endorse international competition, regulated through the existing mechanisms of the 
WTO. However, this is not to say competition is without its pitfalls, and the cocoon of private 
and state means of protection naturally appears more secure.17 It is pertinent to bear in mind 
that the groups encouraging competition policies are those who do not benefit under the 
present capitalist structure, and, therefore, are anxious that the benefits of globalisation might 
not be fully shared without some commitment by key stakeholders to prohibit anti-competitive 
practices. In addition to individual traders’ concerns of international regulatory interference are 
those of developing countries that the regulation of competition is simply a farce and the true 
agenda of the major international stakeholders is to preserve the status quo. This is to retain 
control of channels of trade and distribution of economic activity. Already developing countries 
face barriers to entry to trade, which have been institutionalized by the terms of the WTO 
Agreement.18  
While successful trade is not dependant on competition- as is evidenced by the effectiveness 
of cartels- competition and trade have fundamental effects on one another.19 These effects 
must be mapped out and managed so that the governing instruments do not undermine their 
objectives and inadvertently nullify the developmental potential of any such framework. 
Because of this interplay between trade and competition, it logically follows that the WTO 
would be required to regulate competitive practices on an international level. As mentioned 
earlier, broadly, the WTO’s fundamental principle of non-discrimination evidences the 
organisation’s role in monitoring how Member states treat each other within the competitive 
arena. There are already elements of competition policy ranging across WTO obligations. The 
provisions of WTO Agreements such as the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property 1995 (hereafter referred to as TRIPS)20 and GATS21 Agreements, 
enunciate how anti-competitive practices restrict trade and, more pressingly, limit market 
access. More specifically is the recent development of an International Competition Policy and 
considerations of the WTO’s role in the enforcement of such a policy.22 However, by virtue of 
                                                          
16 Consumers International (note 15 above; 10).  
17 S Woolcock (note 11 above; 6).  
18 B Hoekman and PS Holmes (note 13 above; 880). 
19 B Sweeney ‘International Competition Law and Policy: A Work in Progress’ (2009) 10 Melbourne 
Journal of International Law at 1 – 2. 
20 Article 3, Article 7, Article 8, Article 27, Article 31 and Article 40 of TRIPS 1995 
21 Article VIII and Article IX of GATS 1995. 
22 B Sweeney (note 19 above; 4 – 6).   
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the WTO’s involvement in the development of a consolidated International Competition Policy, 
the primary concern is that the International Competition Policy thereby undermining the pro-
competitive objectives of the proposed instrument might inherit the inherent disparity of the 
Member countries within the organisation.23 
Thus, it must first be accepted that there exists a manner in which the current regulation of 
international competition can be circumvented. Research shows that, whilst international 
competition was initially included on the WTO’s Singapore Round of Negotiations, 
negotiations stalled because of Member states’ inability to agree on a single ordinance of 
competition regulation.24 The default position then became co-operative governance, where 
countries informally agreed to respect and promote- and where possible enforce or assist- in 
the enforcement of the national competition regulation of each other. As idealistic as this 
scenario would be, it poses a number of problems. The most concerning problem is the 
overlap and conflict in legislation and policies. Except where jurisdiction is contractually agreed 
upon, determining the more suitable way to regulate competition, and what the precedence is, 
can be problematic. What is especially risky is stronger countries strong-arming smaller, less 
influential countries into accepting the enforcement of their policies, potentially to their 
detriment. This then feeds into the narrative that trade and competition is geared towards 
protecting and benefitting developed countries, whilst developing countries are overlooked or 
overshadowed or, worse still, bullied into remaining complacent.25  
If research supports the inference that a deficiency exists with the current international 
regulation of competition and this deficiency poses risk to the global economic system, it then 
follows that the deficiency must be addressed and remedied. The obvious solution is 
developing an international standard of regulation; however, this will not be without its 
challenges. As the Singapore Negotiations26 prove, reaching consensus will be one of the 
biggest challenges to overcome.27  Another challenge will be agreeing on a standard that will 
suit the needs of a range of different countries, each with their own economic methods and 
areas of focus.28 To address this, the method or solution should be from the basis of best 
historical model- in other words, looking to national legislation to determine which policy or 
regulation has proved most successful. However, this could potentially be an enormous 
exercise, so for the purposes of this research, it might be best to consider  an overview of 
                                                          
23 S Woolcock (note 11; 6). 
24 S Woolcock (note 11; 3 – 5). 
25 J Tamura ‘Trade and Competition at the WTO: Domestic Regulation and Competition Policy for 
Market Access Development’ 2003 Ford School of Public Policy at 15 – 16. 
26 The First WTO Ministerial Conference, held in Singapore (9 – 13 December 1996). 
27 Consumers International (note 15 above; 14). 
28 Consumers International (note 15 above; 29). 
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success in competition law and focus specifically on one area of legislation, to use as a terms 
of reference.  
Another issue to consider is the WTO’s role in developing such a policy. On the one hand it 
must be appreciated that the WTO could be resourceful based on their expertise in 
international trade and their background knowledge on a number of countries’ methods of 
trade and their national economies and economic needs. However, criticism shows that the 
three major concerns of WTO involvement are: 
i. Their inability to finalize an international competition policy during the 
Singapore Round of Negotiations and an unwillingness to persist in the Doha 
Round of Negotiations29, making their authority and expertise questionable; 
ii. The disparity between developed and developing countries and their trade 
relations30; and 
iii. Although the WTO is probably competent at understanding competition 
specifically in relation to trade, it could very well be inept at governing anti-
competitive practices31, such as collusion, price fixing etc. 
 
Each of these concerns will be addressed in the research, before an overall finding and 
recommendation is made on the limit of the WTO’s involvement.  However, to avoid the 
research digressing from the topic, it will be limited to considering the concerns of the WTO 
as a key role-player from a developing country perspective, looking through the lens of South 
African competition law and domestic economic considerations, and focusing specifically on 
the effect of WTO regulation of competition on the National Treatment Policy.  
 
1.3 KEY RESEARCH QUESTIONS: 
 
The following research questions are pertinent to the study: 
● To what extent has the development of the multilateral trade system from GATT to 
the WTO affected the developments within international competition policies? What 
is the nature of the relationship between competition and trade, and to what extent 
does competition affect international trade relations? 
● How is competition currently regulated internationally and what are the main concerns 
about the WTO’s involvement in developing an international standard of regulation of 
                                                          
29 B Sweeney (note 19 above; 4). 
30 C Oh (note 12 above; 2). 
31 S Woolcock (note 11 above; 6). 
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competition and what role should the World Trade Organisation (WTO) play in this 
development? 
● To what extent does the ‘Proudly South African’ logo and campaign comply with the 
current principles underlying the WTO and is it in line with the existing international, 
regional standards? 
 
1.4 METHODOLOGY: 
The research will be based on primary and secondary research. The purpose is to consider 
current legislation and its effects, against the backdrop of existing articles and research. 
The sources which will be relied on include:  
i. Primary Resources: 
- International trade competition legislation, more specifically WTO legislation, 
including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS); and the Model Provisions on Protection 
Against Unfair Competition under the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO) 
- National competition legislation, including the South African Competition Act and any 
policies of the South African Competition Commission 
- Competition recommendations, including the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD); the United Nations Charter on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations’ Set of Principles and Rules on 
Competition (the Set) 
- Foreign policies on competition and trade, such as the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010  
 
ii. Secondary Resources: 
 
Secondary resources include books and textbooks, journal articles, online newspaper articles 
and web articles.  
 
1.5  LITERATURE REVIEW:  
 
The first key element to decipher in academic text is an understanding of why a single 
regulatory framework for competition might be required. The first point is that the regulation of 
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competition has become more prevalent because of internationalized commerce and the 
interdependent nature of businesses across borders.32 The regulation of competition is 
essential in order to develop domestic enterprises33 and a lapse in international competition 
regulation can result in challenges to gaining market access.34 The fact that an international 
competition framework does not currently exist naturally makes these risks more prevalent.  
Whilst national competition regulation, according to Sweeney, has seen a surge in recent 
times, the differences and overlaps in the policies beneficial to each nation make a 
consolidated approach difficult.35 Some authors are of the view that there is little need to 
regulate competition internationally and, instead, national governments should be tasked with 
developing legislation to protect themselves from within their borders36. There is the 
acknowledgment that the power of states to deal with threats domestically is limited, but it is 
argued that competition practices which are implemented in a regulated manner are market 
enhancing, and thus are required in order to competently balance the access and allocation 
of resources for the maximisation of national welfare. Hoekman emphasises that a lack of 
regulatory oversight runs the risk of hindering access to domestic markets for exporters.37 
Michael Porter, in The Competitive Advantage of Nations38, affirms this by raising the point 
that efforts to relax competition laws has the result of undermining competition entirely, and 
that successful competitive practices require both domestic and international regulation in 
order to flourish.  
Authors tend to have varying views of how to approach this lapse in regulation but, for the 
most part, there is consensus that the role of the WTO should be limited. One proposed 
solution is a unilateral approach, wherein countries independently deal with foreign 
infringement more forcefully. However, the problem with this approach is the risk of defensive 
retaliation39 and, as such; Hoekman concedes that it is ultimately a soft approach with no real 
prospects of long-term successful implementation.40 
A second view is the reliance on regional and bilateral competition agreements. The European 
Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), and the Common Market of 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), to provide a few examples, are already applying 
                                                          
32 B Sweeney (note 19 above; 2). 
33 C Oh (note 12 above; 1). 
34 J Tamura (note 25 above; 1). 
35 B Sweeney (note 19 above; 1 – 2). 
36 B Hoekman and PS Holmes (note 13 above; 877). 
37 B Hoekman and PS Holmes (note 13 above; 877). 
38 M Porter ‘The Competitive Advantage of Nations’ 1998 Palgrave Macmillan at 74. 
39 B Sweeney (note 19 above; 4). 
40 B Hoekman and PS Holmes (note 13 above; 878). 
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this.41 However, there is the argument that this will only provide a temporary solution, as 
bilateral agreements are limited due to the conflict of the differing policies within the 
agreements themselves and the risk of retaliatory action.42 As Viljoen points out in South Africa 
and Namibia: cooperation on competition law, enforcement and policy43 these provisions 
already exist, it is enforcing compliance that is problematic. Bilateral agreements, however, 
are not without purpose as they can be used as precedence for any impending multilateral 
agreement, bearing in mind that such an agreement would be more complex in nature as it 
encompasses wider areas of interests for more states.44  
Finally, there is the argument for the development of a single regulatory authority for 
international competition, namely an international competition agreement. However, this 
brings about the question of how such an ambitious agreement would be developed. The 
various issues with a single agreement include lack of uniformity amongst nations, different 
policy needs, differences in politics and economies, and administrative and procedural 
differences.45 According to Oh, there are two existing competition models that can be 
contrasted, namely the European/USA model, where the approach is to primarily focused on 
curbing anti-competitive practices, versus the Japanese model, where the approach is more 
flexible, as the overarching objective is to use competitive measures to develop a domestic 
policy.46 It is clear that the former model would be favoured by developed countries, as it is 
geared towards ensuring market access, whereas developing countries would endorse the 
latter model, which provides some degree of flexibility. 
If the WTO were to play a significant role in the selection of the approach, and even if the 
Japanese model were chosen, it is still believed that the WTO will prioritize free trade. 47 Whilst 
developed countries are driven by market access issues, rather than holding their national 
firms accountable for improper practices within foreign markets, developing countries are 
more driven by ensuring welfare inducing outcomes. Thus, the major concern with WTO 
involvement is the agenda being dominated by market access issues rather than competition 
issues. Thus, whilst trade and exports is promoted, economic efficiency is neglected.48 
Another general concern is that the WTO would be out of its depth. According to Woolcock, 
the WTO, in its effort to remove trade barriers, is focused on the regulation of public practice. 
                                                          
41 S Woolcock (note 11 above; 18 – 19).  
42 J Tamura (note 25 above; 9 – 10). 
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2016 TRALAC available at https://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/9077-cooperation-on-
competition-and-trade-matters-in-south-africa.html, accessed on 01 July 2019.  
44 J Tamura (note 25 above; 10 – 12).  
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46 C Oh (note 12 above; 2). 
47 C Oh (note 12 above; 4). 
48 B Hoekman and PS Holmes (note 13 above; 882). 
11 
 
Where private regulation is involved, the WTO is inept.49 Should the WTO be responsible for 
implementing an international policy, the outcome would most likely be the incorporation of 
the organisation’s core principles, namely, transparency, non-discrimination, and the inclusion 
of substantive and procedural provisions.50 The WTO agreements, namely the GATT, GATS 
and TRIPS, include their own competitive provisions but, whilst these agreements do contain 
elements of competition law, they largely do not qualify as robust, nor successful, and have, 
in fact, seldom been relied on. There is no overarching set of principles or interpretation of the 
WTO rules as they apply to competition.51 Further, the GATT, GATS and TRIPS provisions 
apply to Member state obligations, thus dealing primarily with barriers to trade between 
nations, rather than holding private firms accountable. This will not suffice as Tamura notes, 
because most anti-competitive behaviour extends from companies themselves. Thus, the 
authority of any organisation regulating competition must be able to address this directly.52 
The WTO should then rather focus on developing trade regulations instead of risking being 
over-burdened with non-trade issues.53 
Finally, there is the concern that, by placing the WTO at the forefront of the development of 
an international competition standard, the needs of developing countries will be overlooked54. 
Developing countries might generally be on a lesser footing as they have less capacity to 
discipline anti-competitive abuses by foreign multinational firms.55 In addition, there is the 
concern that developing countries will be strong-armed into adopting a multilateral policy that 
purports to take into account the needs of all participants, but in reality caters to developed 
countries’ trade objectives primarily. For instance, whilst developed countries will benefit from 
a focus on free trade and like treatment, developing country governments need to prioritize 
providing advantages to local firms, including opposing the National Treatment Policy56, which 
debate is at the core of this paper.  
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Fowler and Watkins in Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, Globalisation and the 
Fight Against Poverty57, Al Jazeera58, Jason Hickel for the Guardian59 and Stewart Patrick for 
the Atlantic60 have taken far harsher viewpoints in their respective articles. The consensus 
there is not simply that the WTO is ill-equipped to address international competition regulation, 
taking into account the needs of developing and least developed countries, but rather that it is 
a mechanism for developed, powerful nations to advance on the back of its smaller ‘allies’. 
While Al Jazeera61 points out that the WTO’s failure to bring the Doha Development Agenda 
shows its lack of commitment to its Asian and African members, who rely on agriculture for 
sustenance, Hickel62 points out that, because developing countries rely so heavily on 
developed countries for funding, this unequal bargaining power means the likelihood of 
developed countries negotiating in good faith is slim.  
However, the role of the WTO in this respect need not be completely non-existent, but should 
rather be limited. Countries will still benefit from the WTO playing an oversight role in 
facilitating international development. In other words, by ensuring each country’s policy is in 
line with the WTO agenda and by facilitating the transparency of various business practices 
of existing WTO Member states.63 
Other suggestions by authors include providing an interim measure, whilst the pursuit of 
consensus amongst countries persists, is making transparent the approach of each country 
towards competition.64 Further, if developing a single agreement proves too burdensome, to 
consider the option of dissecting the different areas of anti-competitive behaviour and 
developing international regulation for each, focusing more specifically on the problematic 
regions. In other words, tackling the task in a piece-meal fashion.65 Lastly, there is the view 
that, whilst the attempts at negotiating a unilateral trade agreement persist, countries should 
continue to focus on ensuring each country at least has a national competition policy to protect 
its domestic interests. If WTO developed Member states really are concerned with the success 
                                                          
57 P Fowler and K Watkins. ‘Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, Globalisation and the Fight 
Against Poverty’ 2002 Oxfam 2 at 276. 
58 Al Jazeera ‘Has the World Trade Organisation failed poor countries?’ 2015 available at 
https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/countingthecost/2015/12/world-trade-organisation-failed-
poor-countries-151219155155237.html, accessed on 15 July 2019. 
59 J Hickel ‘Aid in reverse: how poor countries develop rich countries’ 2017 The Guardian available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2017/jan/14/aid-in-reverse-
how-poor-countries-develop-rich-countries, accessed on 01 July 2019. 
60 S Patrick ‘Why Natural Resources Are a Curse on Developing Countries and How to Fix It’ 2012 
The Atlantic available at https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/why-natural-
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of non-developed states, as purported, they could facilitate the process by aiding developing 
and least developed countries that do not have the resources required to implement a 
competition policy. More specifically, their role can be reduced to bearing the costs associated 
ensuring transparency and procedural fairness where international competition is 
concerned.66 
 
1.6 STRUCTURE  
To proceed, the chapters will be set out as follows: 
Chapter One: Introduction  
This will include the introduction, research questions and research methodology and a 
synopsis of the topic.  
Chapter Two: Background study of the  World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
First focusing on an overall history of the existence of the WTO, the chapter then develops to 
focus specifically on each Round of Negotiations, particularly the Singapore and Doha 
Development Round Agendas, and considers why negotiations proved unsuccessful; 
considering literary criticism on why the role of the WTO in respect of competition should be 
limited, if at all permitted. 
Chapter Three: Competition Law, Policy, and the role of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) 
Following from the previous chapter, this chapter then discusses how competition is currently 
regulated on an international sphere, and not merely from the point of view of the WTO’s 
involvement. It considers the existing lapse in the regulation of international competition and 
analyses the major concerns from various sources, including recommendations from both the 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations 
Charter on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations’ Set of Principles and 
Rules on Competition (the Set), regarding the involvement of the WTO in developing a single 
international competition framework. 
Chapter Four: South Africa’s perspective on international competition and the ‘Proudly 
South African’ campaign 
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A summary of South Africa’s competition regulation, commencing from its WTO involvement 
and obligations and considering how these operate within the national sphere. 
Chapter Five: Conclusion and Recommendations 
Finally, the research closes on the note of whether an international competition policy is 
possible; if so, what model it should follow; and if not, whether any alternatives exist; and what 
role the WTO should have in this development. 
 
1.7 CONCLUSION 
It is apparent that this topic extends far beyond the initial discussion envisaged – is the ‘Proudly 
South African’ logo in direct conflict with the country’s National Treatment Policy obligations 
in terms of the WTO and GATT? On the face of it, it appears that the promotion of local trade 
is not, in fact, a GATT trade concession or exemption. As such, it can only be concluded that 
such a logo is in conflict with a GATT core principle. However, to leave the topic at this juncture 
is too simplistic an approach. It does not take into account that one of the WTO’s key objectives 
is to open trade to the benefit of all. Surely, then, this means that GATT and WTO principles 
should be developed to benefit all its members, including smaller, developing and least 
developed countries that stand to gain from the promotion of local consumption and trade?  
If developing countries cannot find shelter under the auspices of the WTO, then how are they 
protected under international competition regimes? If such protection is afforded, it would 
promote legitimate marketing practices, rather than hinder it. However, the current regulation 
of international competition- or the lack thereof- does not appear to provide much recourse 
either.  The narrative then extends to whether there is a need for competition to be regulated 
through a unilateral international mechanism- much like trade is through the WTO – and, if so, 
what should the WTO’s involvement be?  
By looking at the viewpoints of a number of authors, this research topic delves into whether 
the WTO is equipped to actively partake in the development of an international competition 
organisation, and supporting policies, or whether this will be in conflict of its world trade 
objectives. To do so, the relationship between trade and competition is examined, particularly 
under the WTO and its supporting agreements.  
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CHAPTER TWO:  
BACKGROUND STUDY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION (WTO) 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter considers how the World Trade Organisation (WTO) came into existence by 
reviewing its history. This includes a brief analysis of how international trade relations were 
governed prior to the World Wars and how the onset of the Great Depression forced the 
world’s superpowers to accept that opening their markets to the international community was 
in the best interests of all states. From 1947, negotiations then commenced on establishing 
what is now known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and each 
negotiating round conducted for the purpose of this establishment, as well as the later 
establishment of the WTO, is considered in brief. Particular focus is placed on the later rounds 
of negotiations, including the Tokyo Round, the Uruguay Round, the Singapore Round, and 
the Doha Round, and what progress was made during these negotiations that extended 
beyond reducing trade tariffs, in respect to competition.  
This chapter also succinctly looks at the WTO itself, including the core principles of the 
organisation, what it sets to achieve through its key objectives and how it functions as the 
world’s trade establishment. In this respect, a critical analysis on how successful the WTO’s 
role has been in trade liberalisation and negotiation will be provided. Finally, this chapter 
serves as a basis for later discussions to be embarked in this paper, namely whether the WTO, 
as a supposed successful international trade vehicle, is well equipped to lead progress on 
addressing international competition issues.  
 
2.2 THE HISTORY OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 
(GATT) 
  
Prior to World War I, there was little need for an international regulation of trade. Trade 
relations adhered to bilateral trade treaties and countries were generally free to set and amend 
their tariffs as they saw fit. However, the War brought about higher tariffs, licensing 
requirements, customs controls etc. and this system became ineffective.67 Following the 
conclusion of the Second World War (WW II), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) began to form an existence. Countries initially negotiated to reduce the excessive 
                                                          
67 D Irwin ‘The GATT in Historical Perspective’ The American Economic Review (1995) 85 at 1 – 2.  
16 
 
trade barriers and tariffs brought about by the Great Depression. For the next few years, the 
focus remained on tariff reduction68. Holistically, though, the intent was to create a forum for 
negotiation, illumination and litigation. The former of the intents can be described as the 
GATT’s most successful attribute to date, with trade liberalization negotiations continuing for 
more than 50 years after the conclusion of the Agreement in 1947.69 The inspiration for the 
GATT was the development of an international trade institution, to join the likes of the ‘Bretton 
Woods’ institutions, namely the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.70 Whilst 
more than 50 countries negotiated on the formation of such an institution in Havana, Cuba, 
the scope of focus was found to be too broad- it covered not only trade related issues, but also 
included employment rules, international investment, commodity agreements, and causing 
negotiations to be fruitless.71 
Meanwhile, with the post-war effects of instability still fresh, in 1947 twenty-three countries 
(referred to as contracting parties) commenced negotiations, with the intent to develop rules 
regulating international trade, with the initial focus being tariff reductions. Soon ensued other 
trade liberalization negotiations – as detailed below in each round of negotiations – with more 
countries sighing on to the GATT. In total eight rounds of negotiations have taken place. To 
date the GATT boasts a membership of 128 countries.72  
 
2.2.1 An outline: from pre-GATT enactment to the formation of the WTO 
2.2.1.1 The International Trade Organisation (ITO): 
Post WW1, the formation of the United Nations was underway and countries looked to 
strengthen their international relations to counter against the devastation of the war. The 
United States of America (USA) was offering assistance to its allies (particularly Britain) to 
rebuild after the war. During the loan negotiations between the two super powers, the idea of 
an international trade charter was borne73. In fact, specifically included in the USA-Britain loan 
agreement was a provision for the parties to agree to eliminate discriminatory behaviour in 
trade and commerce by reducing tariffs and other trade barriers.74 The idea behind including 
                                                          
68 C Bown ‘Self-Enforcing Trade: Developing Countries and WTO Dispute Settlement’ 2009 Brookings 
Institution Press at 10 – 11.  
69 C Bown (note 68 above; 11 – 12).  
70 ‘Understanding the WTO: Basics. The GATT Years: from Havana to Marrakesh’ 1995 available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm, accessed 20 June 2019. 
71 Understanding the WTO: Basics. The GATT Years: from Havana to Marrakesh’ 1995 available at 
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72 C Bown (note 68 above; 12 – 13). 
73 W Diebold ‘The End of the I.T.O’ Princeton University (International Finance Section) 1952 (16) at 
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74 Article VII of the Proposals for the Expansion of World Trade and Employment 1946. 
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such a provision was the acknowledgment between two of the world’s most powerful countries 
that the war had devastated not only the countries, but the very people who populated the 
countries. As a result, there was a dire need to provide relief, stabilize economies, provide 
income, better socio-economic circumstances by improving health support, and in essence 
any barriers that hindered this must be done away with. Thus, there was very little conflict 
surrounding the need for an international organisation to govern these trade liberalization 
efforts. Instead, lack of consensus was resultant of countries refusing to risk their sovereignty 
by complying with an overarching international standard.75 
In March 1948, the Draft Charter for an International Trade Organisation was signed at 
Havana. Prior to the signing of the Charter, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) had been negotiated in 1947, intended as an interim arrangement whilst the ITO was 
in the process of being finalized.76 Whilst the Draft Charter was signed, due to the tense 
relations between the superpowers following post-war relations, actually implementing its 
provisions and finalizing the Charter was not deemed a priority. By 1950, the Great Depression 
was waging on. The more people suffered as a result of unemployment, the more it was 
alleged that job security was being threatened by importing. Thus, international trade 
liberalization lost support and momentum and negotiations on the ITO were abandoned.77 
 
2.2.1.2 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): 
Whilst initially intended to serve as an interim measure, following the demise of the ITO, the 
GATT saw itself flourishing as an agreement in its own right. The history of the ITO is evident 
in the writing of the GATT, which set out to reduce tariff and other trade barriers, as the ITO 
had preceded.78 Initially the GATT was signed in Geneva in 1947 temporarily, but to prevent 
all efforts already made in improving international trade relations being fruitless, the application 
of the GATT was extended for a further three years in 1950 in Torquay.79 
The reason the GATT succeeded where the ITO had failed was because, initially, the GATT 
lacked permanency. This put those countries who were sceptical of its effects at ease. The 
fact that the commitments were less binding than the ITO, it was more easily accepted. 
Overtime, however, consensus was reached on the fact that, for the negotiations concluded 
under the GATT to be more effect, the GATT should be awarded a firmer status. This would 
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mean the GATT having its own secretariat, separate personality as a permanent organisation, 
more binding commitments and legislative inclusion from its signatories.80 Below is a summary 
of how the GATT achieved this and bore the World Trade Organisation as a result, and what 
was covered during negotiating rounds by the organisation.  
 
2.2.2  The World Trade Organisation’s Negotiating Rounds: 
i. Geneva Round: April – November 1947.  
Whilst the agenda of this Round- like most following it- was primarily tariff focused, what is of 
most significance is that the culmination of the negotiations led to the original signing of the 
GATT by twenty-three member states.81 Commencing from April 1947, negotiations were held 
on reducing tariffs and completing the charter for the International Trade Organisation (or the 
“Havana Charter”). In October 1947 in Geneva the GATT was signed and by January 1948 
eight of the twenty-three signatories had ratified the Agreement, with the remainder following 
suite over the next few months.82  
The difference between the intended interim GATT and the Havana Charter was that the 
Havana Charter was intended to be more comprehensive, dealing not only with reducing 
tariffs, but also: reducing all restrictions to trade; improving labour and employment relations; 
economic developing; subsidies; antidumping and countervailing duties; developing free trade 
areas; restrictive business practices et al. Thus, the signing of the GATT in 1947 was not 
intended to be a long-term obligation.83  
Before the Kennedy Round in 1964, the Rounds following the formation of the GATT were 
focused primarily on trade reductions, as initially intended. These include: 
ii. Annecy Round: April – August 1949:  In the second Round of GATT negotiations 
tariffs were reduced by a further 5000 concessions;84 
 
iii. Torquay Round: September 1950 – May 1951: This Round saw the reduction of the 
Geneva Round tariffs by a further 25%;85 
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iv. Geneva Round II: January – June 1956: In the second Round held in Geneva tariffs 
were further reduced by $2.5 billion;86 
 
v. Dillon Round: September 1960 – August 1961: During this round of negotiation tariffs 
were reduced by $4.9 billion;87 
 
vi. Kennedy Round: May 1964 – June 1967: For the first time since the inception of the 
GATT, the focus of the Rounds shifted to including issues other than tariff concessions. During 
this Negotiating Round, the contracting parties considered developing anti-dumping policies, 
the result of which formed the GATT Anti-Dumping Agreement. And thus began the expansion 
of GATT focus to negotiate more than just tariff concessions;88 
 
vii. Tokyo Round: September 1973 – November 1979: By now GATT membership had 
increased to 120 contracting parties. In addition to further tariff reductions, the Round also 
included talks on non-tariff barriers, providing an agreement on safeguards, subsidies and 
countervailing measures, to name but a few. The agreements borne of the Tokyo Round 
include the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures; the Technical Barriers to 
Trade Agreement; the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures; the WTO Agreement on 
Customs Valuation; the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (or the Anti-Dumping Agreement); the Plurilateral Agreement on 
Government Procurement; the International Bovine Meat Agreement and the Agreement on 
Trade in Civil Aircraft.89 However, the Round continued for longer than envisioned, primarily 
due to lack of consensus on these new issues. Because a number of members refused to 
subscribe to these new codes, there was little multilateral effect. Only the first five Agreements 
listed were binding on all members; the remainder were plurilateral agreements.90 Another 
critique was the GATT’s refusal to consider agricultural issues, a major area of concern for 
most developing countries. This highlights the impending difficulty experienced in attempts to 
broaden the mandate of focus areas;91 and  
 
viii. Uruguay Round: September 1986 – April 1994. This Round saw the most progress, 
covering almost every aspect of trade- most notably including talks on trade in services and 
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intellectual property- and lasting over 7 years. The most successful negotiation, however, was 
the agreement to form an international trade organisation, namely the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), conceded by 123 contracting parties. Whilst the WTO replaced the GATT 
as an international organisation, the GATT itself remains in existence as the treaty to the WTO. 
The round itself was tedious, and whilst ultimately successful, led many to believe a 
Negotiation of this magnitude could never again be successfully achieved.92 
 
2.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION (WTO) AND THE 
LATER ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS 
 
Whilst the GATT proved successful in liberalizing international trade, still the calls remained 
for a stronger multilateral organisation. Thus the WTO was born following the Uruguay 
Round.93 Prior to the commencement of the Uruguay Round, the GATT 1947 underwent 
modifications and amendments that brought to fruition what is now referred to as GATT 1994, 
as well as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). This proved an integral part of the 
development of the WTO, because after 47 years of work and negotiations, leading to the 
growth of the GATT signatories and the eventual membership of the WTO, the GATT finally 
graduated from a provisional agreement to being accepted as a de facto global trade 
agreement.  Thus, through the evolution of the GATT, the way was paved for the official 
international trade organisation.94  
 
2.3.1 The fundamental principles of the GATT and WTO: 
Stemming from the GATT before it, the principles of the WTO retained the same intended 
output but were extended. These inherited principles include:  
i. non-discrimination i.e. through the most-favoured nation and national 
treatment principles;95 
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ii. reciprocity i.e. enabling mutual exchange of market access between 
members;96 
iii. trade liberalization i.e. continuing with negotiations on reducing tariffs and 
eliminating other barriers to trade;97  
iv. predictability and transparency i.e. having binding commitments not to raise 
trade barriers without first compensating other member states;98  
v. fairness i.e. by discouraging unfair competitive practices, including export 
subsidies and dumping;99 and  
vi. technical aid and development reform i.e. assisting developing and least 
developed countries to meet their WTO obligations by allowing flexible time 
adjustments and certain privileges and concessions.100 
In summary, the purpose of these principles are protection against discriminatory practices 
(through the most-favoured nation and national treatment articles), especially in favour of 
protection for smaller, less powerful states; to ensure a boost in market access and protect 
against market access and trade barriers; and ensuring certainty and predictability in 
economic markets.101 
Identified from the above are what are known as the three core principles of international trade- 
i. Reciprocity:  
Reciprocity involves maintaining a balance within the market and ensuring each of 
the contracting parties are afforded the same benefits within the ambit of the GATT 
and WTO. In essence, reciprocity works in two ways: 1. when a country raises its 
import tariff to a higher level than its bound tariff, the contracting parties affected by 
such a raise can in turn negotiate a reciprocal market access change in another area 
of interest; and 2. when a country changes its market access and adversely affects 
other trading partners, those affected can rely on the dispute settlement process to 
obtain a ruling allowing them to rebalance market access obligations.102 
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https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm, accessed on 15 July 2019. 
101 K Anderson (note 93 above; 4). 
102 C Bown (note 68 above; 6 – 7). 
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ii. Most Favoured Nation (MFN) Treatment:  
Both the MFN treatment and national treatment principle are in effect principles of 
non-discrimination. Any treatment- including lower tariffs and market access – offered 
to one GATT member by another, must in turn be offered to every GATT member, 
unless a deviation from the principle is permitted (i.e. through regional trade 
agreements or preferential trade agreements).103 
Prior to the inclusion of the MFN Clause within the GATT, the MFN principle “has long 
been the cornerstone of all modern commercial treaties and remains at the heart of 
contemporary commercial trade”.104 Thus, MFN clauses have historically existed in 
some form or the other, even prior to being codified within the GATT. However, the 
historical trend of MFN application was one-sided, as where powerful states sought 
to secure unilateral pledges from less powerful- and more dependant- states. The 
overall effect was not reciprocal, which counters the GATT’s motivation. The 
unilateral form has since fallen out of favour because it is “incompatible with the 
principle of sovereign equality of states”.105  
Before the adoption of the contemporary MFM as adopted and endorsed within the 
GATT today was the development of the MFN from lacking reciprocity to a conditional 
MFN clause. The logic was that a conditional clause, which allowed for certain 
concessions, would be equivalent to having the effect of no clause at all106. And whilst 
the MFN clause today purports to have a single effect, the reality is that countries still 
differ on their opinion of its interpretation, with countries such as the United Kingdom 
arguing that the intended effect is broad, and others like the United States of America 
preferring a restrictive interpretation.107 The purpose of the MFN clause is to promote 
“fair and equitable treatment” i.e. to treat all contracting parties without discrimination.  
The MFN is deemed so important that is in fact the first article of the GATT. It 
canvasses 39 pages and four comprehensive sections.  The key excerpt of the MFN 
clause is as follows: 
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in 
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international 
                                                          
103 Article I of the GATT 1947. 
104 S Vesel ‘Clearing a Path Through a Tangled Jurisprudence: Most-Favoured Nation Clause and 
Dispute Settlement Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (2007) 32 (1) Yale Journal of 
International Law at 126.  
105 S Vesel (note 104 above; 128 – 129). 
106 S Vesel (note 104 above; 110). 
107 S Vesel (note 104 above; 132). 
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transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of 
levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in 
connection with importation and exportation […] any advantage, favour, 
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating 
in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of 
all other contracting parties108 
In Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment in International Investment Law: Ascertaining 
the Limits through Interpretative Principles author PR Thulasidhass contends that 
whilst the intention of the provision might be to create certainty, uniformity and ensure 
fair and equitable treatment in trade, the true result is instead fragmented and 
unrestricted and reduces the policy-making freedom of sovereign states, and 
contends that the clause should not be applied without limitation or restriction109. The 
OECD seems to echo the author and in its report finds that, whilst the treaty purports 
to create certainty, it in fact lacks certainty due to its relative standard- in other words 
the treaty does not interpret the treatment of nations within the borders of other 
member states, but rather the treatment of nations in comparison other like nations. 
There is no primary standard of treatment- so long as the treatment is no less 
favourable to that afforded to another nation, the treaty is not contravened. The treaty 
would thus offer no protection where all nations are treated equally badly110.  
iii. National Treatment:  
Once a GATT member’s foreign-produced good enters into the market of another 
GATT member, the national like-good must be afforded treatment no less favourable 
than those of foreign competitors. This means the imported good cannot be subject 
to additional taxes or regulatory barriers that would differentiate it from the nationally 
produced good.111 
The criticism surrounding the national treatment policy is that it potentially has the 
effect of hindering a nation’s sovereignty by impacting on its freedom to implement 
its own domestic policies relating to the taxation of imported goods. Another criticism 
                                                          
108 Article I of the GATT 1947. 
109 PR Thulasidhass ‘Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment in International Investment Law: Ascertaining 
the Limits through Interpretative Principles’ 2015 Amsterdam Law Forum at 4.  
110 A Faya-Rodriguez and B Joubin-Bret ‘Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment – UNCTAD Series on Issues 
in International Investment Agreements II’ 2011 UNCTAD at 111 – 112.  
111 Article III of the GATT 1947. 
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is that the WTO Panels and Appellate Body112 appear to interpret Article III without 
consideration of whether the additional taxes or any other perceived barrier 
prescribed on the imported products would have any bearing on the market. As 
Henrik Horn and Petros Mavroidis point out, “Article III is there to protect expectations 
about a behaviour and trade effects are, consequently, irrelevant”.113 The authors go 
on to suggest that the incorporation of the national treatment policy into domestic 
legislation would be better received by government officials if the outcomes of not 
affording national treatment to like products was considered and steps were only 
taken for actions that would have the effect of undoing trade liberalization steps. 
Thus, this would give countries the freedom to pursue their own internal policies, as 
long as the deliverables are in line with trade liberalization efforts. The effect would 
be appeasing countries that are fearful of the adverse effect on their state 
sovereignty.114 Other principles of the WTO include the general prohibition of 
quantitative restrictions (QRS), which, as per Article XI115, and subject to certain 
exceptions, where a quantity of products has been authorized for importation or 
exportation, Members cannot then restrict or prohibit this quantity; the observance of 
binding levels of tariff concessions and specific commitments (i.e. goods and 
services), where Members commit to minimum market access conditions; and 
transparency, meaning that Members’ relative trade regulations and policies are kept 
transparent by informing the WTO and other Members.116 
 
2.3.2 The objectives and benefits of the WTO: 
The key objectives of the WTO are found in the Preamble to the Agreement Establishing the 
WTO117 and are set out as follows: 
1. The WTO aims to raise the living standards of its Members’ citizens through trade in 
both goods and services by providing a growth in employment, and increase in 
salaries, by optimally using resources sourced both nationally and internationally; and  
                                                          
112 As highlighted in the following cases: Japan- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (WTO Doc. WT/DS8 
of 4 October 1996); Korea- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (WTO Doc. WT/DS 75 of 18 January 
1999); and Chile- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (WTO Doc. WT/DS87 of 13 December 1999). 
113 H Horn and PC Mavrodis ‘Still Hazy After all These Years: The Interpretation of National Treatment 
in the GATT/WTO Case-Law on Tax Discrimination’ (2004) 15 (1) European Journal of International 
Law (EJIL) at 50.  
114 H Horn and PC Mavrodis (note 113 above; 52 – 53). 
115 Article XI of the GATT 1994. 
116 ‘Module 1 – Introduction to the World Trade Organisation (WTO)’ 2012 World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) E-Campus at 4.  
117 The GATT 1994.  
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2. Focus especially on the needs of developing countries and least developed countries 
to ensure they partake in and enjoy the fruits of a well-functioning international system 
of trade118 
 
In order to fulfil these objectives the WTO has the following functions to fulfil, as set out in 
Article III119: 
1. The administration of trade related agreements between WTO Members, by 
facilitating the implantation, administration and operation of these Agreements;120 
2. Multilateral trade negotiation of its Members, concerning both existing topics covered 
by the GATT and any new topics of interest;121 
3. Constructive dispute handling through its Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 
whereby the appropriate forum established by the Organisation provides recourse to 
Members who cannot otherwise negotiate and mutually resolve an issue;122 
4. Monitoring Members’ national trade policies through the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism, which helps facilitate the fundamental principle of transparency;123 
5. Co-operation with other Bretton Woods institutions (i.e. the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank), and in terms of the ‘coherence mandate124’ which requires 
the WTO to establish “effective cooperation with other intergovernmental 
organisations that have responsibilities related to those of the WTO” and to consult 
and cooperate “with non-governmental organisations concerned with matters related 
to those of the WTO”125; and  
6. Technical assistance, whereby the WTO supports developing and least-developed 
countries to transition to the WTO rules, and to implement its obligations and know 
the mechanisms available to exercise its rights.126  
 
                                                          
118 Preamble to the GATT 1994. 
119 Article III of the GATT 1994. 
120 ‘Module 1 – Introduction to the World Trade Organisation (WTO)’ 2012 World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) E-Campus at 11. 
121 ‘Module 1 – Introduction to the World Trade Organisation (WTO)’ 2012 World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) E-Campus at 11. 
122 ‘Module 1 – Introduction to the World Trade Organisation (WTO)’ 2012 World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) E-Campus at 11. 
123 ‘Module 1 – Introduction to the World Trade Organisation (WTO)’ 2012 World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) E-Campus at 11 – 12.  
124 Article V to the GATT 1994. 
125 ‘Module 1 – Introduction to the World Trade Organisation (WTO)’ 2012 World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) E-Campus at 12. 
126 ‘Module 1 – Introduction to the World Trade Organisation (WTO)’ 2012 World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) E-Campus at 12. 
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Chad Bown brands the GATT and its successor, the WTO, only ‘moderately successful’ in 
achieving its objectives. However, the author appears to accept that the WTO’s task of 
negotiating provisions with a vast number of Member states is far from simple and for that 
reason, the GATT/WTO has shown its relevance and why it is an essential part of international 
economic relations127. Brigette Stern states that the WTO’s principal purpose, or overarching 
objective, can be summarised as an attempt “to foster liberalisation in all sectors of economic 
activity”. Thus, when determining the success of the GATT and the WTO the question is 
whether the organisation has managed to successfully achieve this. The author’s final view is 
that, whilst the WTO can be used as a universal tool to deal with aspects of multilateral trade, 
it is not effective on its own. This is because the objectives of the WTO are primarily centred 
on trade liberalisation, in other words increasing globalisation as opposed to bettering the 
current system in existence, which would require correcting the structural deficiencies of the 
international trade market.128  
 
2.3.3 Further Rounds of Negotiations 
What is important to note is that during each of the eight Rounds of Negotiations, and over a 
period of almost 50 years, the subject of international competition and the regulation thereof 
never entered into negotiations. After the dismal attitude following the Uruguay Round, the 
idea of broaching this subject seemed even more far off. 
 
2.3.3.1 Singapore Round: December 1996 – September 2003.  
However, during the Singapore Round, this issue was finally addressed. The Round itself 
focused on issues of investment, competition, government procurement and trade facilitation. 
The WTO set up three working groups to consider these issues. However, as a result of lack 
of development in negotiations, it was decided that, following the 2003 Cancun Ministerial 
Conference, the only Singapore issue to be considered would be trade facilitation, which would 
be the focus of the Doha Development Round of Negotiations. As a result, competition was 
deprioritized.129  
 
                                                          
127 C Bown (note 68 above; 9).  
128 B Stern ‘Governing Rules and Principles of the WTO: Its scope and future developments in the 
context of globalisation’ 1999 Law, Democracy and Development at 11. 
129 R Sandrey ‘WTO and the Singapore Issues’ (2006) 18 TRALAC at 7 available at 
https://www.tralac.org/publications/article/6840-wto-and-the-singapore-issues.html, accessed on 15 
July 2019. 
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2.3.3.2 Doha Round (or the Doha Development Agenda):  
November 2001 – July 2008 (note: whilst negotiations stalled in 2008, there have been several 
attempts to revive the talks, however, to date there has been little success). Superseding the 
Uruguay Round as the largest round of trade negotiations, the agenda of the Doha Round 
focused primarily on reforming the present international trading system. The mandate for the 
negotiations were provided for in the Doha Ministerial Declaration and included topics such as 
intellectual property, international services, agriculture, lower trade barriers, and revised trade 
rules. Development, however, remained at the core of the negotiations, including offering 
assistance to developing countries in implementing the WTO’s mandate.130 The Doha Round 
has established some success. The ‘Bali Package’, an agreement focusing primarily on trade 
facilitation, as well as development, which includes food security, provisions on the cotton 
industry in developing countries, reducing export subsidies in agriculture et al, is one such 
example.131 The ‘Nairobi Package’, which contains six Ministerial Decisions on agriculture and 
the cotton industry, public stockholding for food security, safeguards for developing countries, 
preferential treatment for least developed countries (LDCs) in services and trade preferences 
is another.132 
 
2.4 THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Whilst the formation of a single forum to negotiate trade relations was a feat many had been 
sceptical of, the success of the GATT and the subsequent WTO was not without its critics. 
One of the most prevalent points of criticism was that the WTO focused primarily on the needs 
of developed, ‘superpowers’ and the inclusion of developing and least developed countries (or 
LDCs) in negotiations was merely a farce as the needs of these countries were never 
prioritized. 
The WTO does purport to concentrate on the needs of developing countries and LDCs by way 
of special and preferential treatment, support, trade opportunities, infrastructure support, 
encouraging Member aid and support et al, with at least 75% of WTO membership being made 
up of developing countries, critiques argue that the WTO’s current contribution to development 
does not suffice133. Fowler and Watkins describes the WTO as“… a governance system based 
                                                          
130 ‘The Doha Round’ available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm, accessed 
on 26 June 2019.  
131 ‘Day 3, 4 and 5: Round-the-clock consultations produce ‘Bali Package’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/mc9sum_07dec13_e.htm, accessed on 26 June 2019. 
132 ‘WTO members secure “historic” Nairobi Package for Africa and the world’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/mc10_19dec15_e.htm, accessed on 26 June 2019.  
133 ‘The WTO can help countries develop’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10thi_e/10thi06_e.htm, accessed on 30 June 2019.  
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on a dictatorship of wealth”, finding that developed countries have a disproportionate influence 
over the operation of the organisation.134 What appears to be the consensus of a number of 
writers is that the WTO has failed those who need and rely on it most. 
Some critics point to the failure of the developed countries to bring the Doha Development 
Agenda to finality as the reason why confidence in the WTO wanes. With many African and 
Asian third world countries relying on agriculture for sustenance and national wealth, the fact 
that this issue has remained unresolved for 14 years perpetuates the idea that the WTO 
prioritises the needs of Western superpowers.135 Given the history of most developing 
countries, the culture is to rely on western funding in order to survive. Thus, an unequal 
bargaining power exists.136 Africa itself is an example of this. Referred to as the “resource 
curse”, African countries are renowned for vast natural resources that could stabilize the 
economies of most of its countries, yet leaves the citizens poor.137 A number of factors result 
in this, including the fact that, through globalization and open markets, the West has unlimited 
access to Africa’s resources. While raw materials are an essential contribution to every facet 
of economic activity, the trend is for the West to export these into African countries at lower 
prices. As the West has better developed and more advanced industrial resources, as well as 
stronger economies and access to funds, this allows it to develop the resource further and 
dump it back into the same countries.138 Thus, not only are developing countries, in essence, 
purchasing their own resources back, they are also missing out on employment opportunities 
where resources are exported and refined, rather than this taking place within their own 
territories.139  
While developing and least developed countries are supposedly protected through, certain 
trade concessions and development assistance provided for by developed countries, this is 
not without terms and conditions. The South Africa-USA chicken saga is such an example.  In 
this instance, the South African poultry industry could not compete with the extremely low price 
of the unwanted USA chicken being dumped. SA attempted to balance the impact of the 
alleged dumping by increasing tariffs; however, this was met with threats from the USA to 
exclude SA from AGOA completely, highlighting the unequal bargaining power referred to 
between developing and developed countries.140 Concerning international trade relations, 
                                                          
134 P Fowler and K Watkins (note 57 above; 276). 
135 Al Jazeera (note 58 above).  
136 J Hickel (note 59 above).  
137 S Patrick (note 60 above). 
138 S Patrick (note 60 above).  
139 S Patrick (note 60 above). 
140 ‘Unwanted American chicken dumped in South Africa’ available at https://www.health24.com/Diet-
and-nutrition/Food-safety/unwanted-american-chicken-dumped-in-south-africa-20160324, accessed 
on 30 June 2019.   
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developing countries oftentimes feel as if they are strong-armed into agreements that are not 
necessarily preferential but, faced with the prospect of being denied access to funding and 
resources, appear to be the best choice in the circumstances. This attitude will inevitably spill 
over to competition, should the WTO be tasked with determining a unilateral competition 
policy.  
In terms of application and dispute resolution, in the Kodak/Fuji Film141 case, the WTO failed 
to take into account the accusations of anti-competitive behaviour on the basis that the 
behaviour itself, while morally questionable, did not in fact amount to a violation of Japan’s 
WTO commitments. While the organisation took a more progressive stance in the Mexico- 
Telecoms142 case, it can be argued that the anti-competitive behaviour complained of was 
extreme in nature and also represented a violation of specific WTO commitments.143 
The problems of the WTO make reaching consensus difficult, as apparent by the Doha 
Development Round. This can be attributed to bad management on the part of the 
organisation.144 Criticism of the WTO ranges from the organisation failing dispute settlement 
procedure and its lack of authority to enforce DSU decisions to problems with protectionist 
measures, including anti-dumping measures and retaliatory actions. The overarching result of 
this criticism is the lack of confidence in the organisation itself. By failing to conclude the Doha 
Round, this has only served to strengthen the view that, where trade relations are concerned, 
the WTO may have bitten off more than it can chew. The objectives of that Round are 
considered crucial to not only development, but also removing trade barriers, allowing for 
better market access and overall strengthening the multilateral system. Perhaps the WTO’s 
rule of a single undertaking renders consensus an almost impossibility, however, the most 
attributable factor to the lack of finality is probably that the organisation needs to lower its 
focus.145 With this in mind, and the fact that a number of trade issues still remain pending and 
require address, how can the WTO be the forum to negotiate on international competition? 
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
Following the World Wars and the effect of the Great Depression, the world at large began to 
see that higher tariffs and restricted market access threatened the globe’s economy. Thus, 
                                                          
141 Japan- Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper WT/DS44/R at 2 – 3. 
142 Mexico- Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services WT/DS204/R at 2. 
143 AF Abbott and S Shanker ‘Competition Policy and International Trade Distortions’ 2013 European 
Yearbook of International Economic Law at 31.  
144 EM Dickinson ‘The Doha Development Dysfunction: Problems of the WTO Multilateral Trading 
System’ 2013 The Global Business Law Review at 234.   
145 EM Dickinson (note 144 above; 234 – 235).  
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the formation of the GATT and later the WTO was necessitated.  The initial International Trade 
Organisation (later replaced with the WTO) would act as the Bretton Woods institution on 
international trade, but to reach consensus with dozens of countries on how such an institution 
should be regulated, and the type of issues it should be concerned with, was not easy. Thus, 
the WTO as what how it is known today took a number of years and many rounds of 
negotiations until its formation was effected and it became fully operational. Not all of these 
rounds were successful and some, like the Uruguay Round, took many years to conclude, 
whereas the Doha Round was never concluded due to lack of consensus amongst its 
members.  
Whilst the WTO has achieved success in establishing itself as the de facto global trade 
organisation, it is still criticized, primarily for supposedly prioritizing the needs of developed 
countries over that of developing countries146, with criticism ranging from the organisation’s 
failing dispute settlement procedure and its lack of authority to enforce DSU decisions147 to 
problems with protectionist measures, including anti-dumping measures148 and retaliatory 
actions149, causing confidence in the organisation to wane.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
146 S Vessel (note 104 above; 128 – 129). 
147 J Hickel (note 59 above). 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY AND THE ROLE OF THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANISATION 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
International trade results in global competitive markets that requires particular frameworks 
that encapsulates this complex area. Following from the previous chapter-, which considered 
competition solely from the perception of its development within the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) - this chapter, then discusses how competition is currently regulated on an international 
sphere, and not merely from the point of view of the WTO’s involvement. Thus, it goes beyond 
merely considering the role of the WTO and as such considers how there presently exists a 
lapse in the regulation of international competition. An analysis is then made of the major 
concerns from various authors and sources regarding the WTO’s involvement in developing a 
multilateral competition framework agreement and considering what role the WTO should, in 
fact, play in regulation. The chapter will engage in a review of the WTO and its ancillary 
agreements, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS).150 It will also look at the recommendations of both the Organisation 
for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Charter on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD)151 and the United Nations’ Set of Principles and Rules on 
Competition (the Set), which flows from UNCTAD. The purpose is to ascertain whether there 
is a lack of established international competition principles. Further, the chapter will reveal that 
competition is governed unilaterally and through co-operative measures between 
governments, or through bilateral and regional agreements.  The views of a few authors are 
                                                          
150 According to the website of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), the organisation’s primary objective is to improve the economic and social status of people 
globally by providing a forum for governments to share policies and problems so as to bring about 
social change, The OECD is primarily concerned with global finances and the improvement thereof, 
paying special attention to any endeavours to promote the financial status of global economies, and 
forecasting any risks that could pose a negative outcome. This means the organisation has a special 
interest in how competition policies and anti-competitive behaviours and practices have an adverse 
effect on the financial wellbeing of the population at large. ‘About the OECD’ available at 
https://www.oecd.org/about/, accessed on 15 July 2019.  
151 Established by the United Nations in 1964, the role of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) is that of an intergovernmental organisation tasked with providing support to 
developing countries to ensure economic integration into a fast developing global economy. To 
achieve this, UNCTAD assists with providing funding for development, but also addresses economic 
and development challenges, including the regulation of competition. ‘About UNCTAD’ available at 
https://unctad.org/en/Pages/aboutus.aspx, accessed on 15 July 2019. 
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shared; these views not only reflect the need and plausibility of a multilateral policy, but also 
consider the role the WTO should play in developing such a policy. 
To decipher the above, the chapter first defines international competition policy by giving 
attention to how it is interpreted by the WTO and other international competition bodies such 
as the OECD and UNCTAD. Further, the chapter then compares these definitions to assess 
how these definitions relate to what is understood by national competition policy, meaning the 
competition regulation generally employed within an individual state, in comparison to 
multilateral competition regulation.  
 
3.2 THE MEANING OF COMPETITION POLICY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW  
 
3.2.1  The definition of national competition law and policy 
What is key to note is that competition law and competition policy, whilst referred to 
interchangeably, in fact bear different meanings. According to Hoekman and Holmes, 
competition law is: 
 a set of rules and disciplines maintained by governments relating either to 
 agreements between firms that restrict competition or to the abuse of a 
 dominant position.152  
Competition policy, on the other hand, is conferred a broader meaning by the authors and is 
defined as: 
 […] the set of measures and instruments used by governments that determine 
 the “conditions of competition” that reign on their markets.153  
Competition law and competition policy, however, are terms that are not ordinarily defined 
explicitly, but rather their meaning can be conferred within the context they are used. Thus, to 
understand what constitutes either, one must first be familiar with what the law or policy would 
regulate i.e. what is an anti-competitive practice. Other terms for anti-competitive practices, 
include restrictive business practices, monopolistic practices et al, but these terms are 
generally all conferred the same meaning.154 Attempts to regulate anti-competitive practices 
                                                          
152 B Hoekman and PS Holmes (note 13 above; 8). 
153 B Hoekman and PS Holmes (note 13 above; 9). 
154 OECD Global Forum on Competition ‘Competition Law and Policy in South Africa’ 2003 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Competition Division and Centre for Co-
Operation with Non-Members at 4.   
33 
 
became prevalent as early as the 1930s, when the International Trade Organisation described 
it as practices that “[…] have harmful effects of the expansion of production or trade […]”.155 
The ITO further included examples of such practices:  
a. price fixing agreements on terms and conditions of supply of a product; b. 
agreements to exclude suppliers or allocating markets between suppliers; c. 
discrimination against particular enterprises; d. limiting production or fixing production 
quotas; e. agreements preventing the development of particular technologies; and f. 
unjustified or unlawful extensions of patent or intellectual property rights.156  
However, these provisions have no real effect as the Charter was never formally adopted due 
to the United States’ refusal to ratify it.157 One author defines anti-competitive practices as 
“[…] business conduct that is deemed to harm the competitive process […]”, and substantiates 
this brief definition with examples that includes collusive or exclusionary agreements entered 
into between competitors, abuse of monopoly power and anti-competitive mergers; and states 
that competition policy has the effect of promoting welfare, must like trade law and policy.158 
Another does not define what constitutes anti-competitive behaviour, but rather provides 
examples, which include international trade cartels and monopolistic behaviour amongst 
international mergers.159 Interestingly, the  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
defines anti-competitive behaviour as “[…] practices that limit or prevent competition […]”, and 
expand this definition to include cartels, collective bargaining and boycotts, exclusive dealing, 
the misuse of market power, the refusal to supply products or services, and the more general 
anti-competitive conduct and unconscionable conduct (the definition of these examples is 
further expanded below).160 Closer to home is the definition contained in the Competition Act 
89 of 1998 (hereafter referred to as the Competition Act), which defines restrictive business 
practices as: 
any practices that “[…] has the effect of substantially preventing, or lessening, 
competition in a market […]161” by “[…] directly or indirectly fixing a purchase or selling 
price or any other trading condition; dividing markets by allocating customers, 
suppliers, territories, or specific types of goods or services, or collusive tendering 
                                                          
155 Chapter V of the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organisation 1948. 
156 Article 46 of the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organisation 1948. 
157 S Bilal and O Marcelo ‘Competition Policy and the WTO: Is there a need for a multilateral 
agreement’ 1998 (98/W/02) European Institute of Public Administration at 6.  
158 AF Abbott and S Shankar (note 144 above; 23). 
159 S Nagaoka ‘International Trade Aspects of Competition Policy’ in University of Chicago Press (ed) 
Deregulation and Interdependence in the Asia-Pacific Region vol 8 (2000) at 56 – 60.    
160 ‘Business – Anti-Competitive’ available at https://www.accc.gov.au/business/anti-competitive-
behaviour, accessed on 30 June 2019.  
161 S 4 (1) (a) 89 of 1998. 
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[…].162 This definition includes both horizontal163 and vertical practices.164 Other 
examples of anti-competitive practices include abuse of a dominant position,165 price 
discrimination,166 and the prohibition of certain mergers that fail to conform to the 
standards provided for in the Act and by the Competition Commission.167 
To substantiate the definition of certain examples of anti-competitive practices: 
i. Anti-competitive conduct: “[…] contracts, arrangements, understandings or 
concerted practices that have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially 
lessening competition in a market […]”168 
ii. Cartels: “Businesses that make agreements with their competitors to fix prices, 
rig bids, share markets or restrict outputs […]”169 
iii. Collective bargaining and boycotts: “[…] to fix prices, restrict outputs or allocate 
customers, suppliers or territories […]”170 
iv. Exclusive dealing: “[…]when one person trading with another imposes some 
restrictions on the other’s freedom to choose with whom, in what, or where they 
deal […]”, with the effect of substantially lessening competition171  
v. Misuse of market power: where a business with “substantial degree of power 
in the market” engages in conduct that “[…] has the purpose, effect or likely 
effect of substantially lessening competition in a market”172 
vi. Unconscionable conduct: “[business] conduct which is so harsh that it goes 
against good conscience”.173 
 
In summary, then competition law can be defined as a component of competition policy, which 
is used to regulate anti-competitive or restrictive or monopolistic practices, which, in brief, can 
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be defined as harmful conduct that has the effect of lessening or restricting competition in 
business,  
3.2.2 The WTO’s definition of international competition policy 
It should be noted that the definitions ascribed above are applicable to national competition 
law and policy. Within the context of international law, the WTO defines competition policy 
similarly to the aforementioned authors as: 
[…] policy dealing with the behaviour or enterprises, and, specifically, the 
regulation of anti-competitive practice.174  
However, this definition still pertains to how national governments deal with anti-competitive 
practices within their national jurisdictions, and not how competition is internationally defined 
and perceived. Thus, to define competition as it pertains specifically to international trade, 
reliance was placed on a WTO dispute settlement ruling most closely linked to anti-competitive 
practices. In the Mexico – Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services matter (or the 
Mexico-Telecomms case) the WTO dispute settlement panel decided on a complaint made by 
the United States that, “[…] Mexico adopted or maintained anti-competitive and discriminatory 
regulatory measures, tolerated certain privately-established market access barriers […]”.175 
Whilst the panel does not specifically define international competition- or even competition- 
within its findings, its interpretation on what constitutes ‘anti-competitive practices’ appears to 
be measures that limit market access, and/or infringe on the principle of non-discrimination or 
any other international commitments.176 
Like its predecessor, the ITO, the WTO’s definition is primarily trade reflective, as opposed to 
determining competition as an issue that is related to, but still wholly independent from, trade. 
This divergence in how the WTO defines competition versus how national competition is 
understood is probably the primary reason why the WTO’s role in developing an international 
competition standard is widely criticised. Whilst national competition policies ordinarily 
encompass rules to combat international price fixing cartels and export cartels; the regulation 
of international mergers; the reduction of policies that discriminate against foreign goods; 
introducing pro-competitive policy reforms; and also market access related issues, the WTO’s 
stance on competition seems focused only on the latter i.e. how competition affects market 
access.177 This conflict in focus will be expanded upon later. 
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3.2.3 The OECD’s definition of international competition policy 
In contrast to the WTO, the OECD defines competitiveness as “a measure of a country’s 
advantage or disadvantage in selling its products in international markets”178 and anti-
competitive practices as “[…] a wide range of business practices in which a firm or group of 
firms may engage in order to restrict inter-firm competition to maintain or increase their relative 
market position and profits without necessarily providing goods and services at a lower cost 
or of higher quality.179 Within the definition are specific examples including cartels, collusion, 
conspiracy, mergers, price discrimination, price fixing, exclusive dealing, market restrictions, 
resale price maintenance et al.180  Given the OECD’s role in setting international standard on 
economic issues, it is well-equipped to contribute to the conversation concerning international 
competition. On this note, it is evident that the OECD’s view of anti-competitiveness is wider 
than that of the WTO in that it is not oriented on market access issues only.  
 
3.2.4 The UNCTAD’s definition of international competition policy 
UNCTAD describes competition policy broadly as the preservation of the operation of a 
competitive market mechanism. Like the OECD, UNCTAD includes specific examples of what 
amounts to anti-competitive practices (or restrictive business practices (RBPs)) such as 
collusion, cartels, price-fixing, monopolization, unfair or discriminatory market terms, et al.181 
UNCTAD also recognises the split in anti-competitive practices between businesses (i.e. 
conduct that restrains competition) and government policies that burden competition.182  
UNCTAD further distinguishes two root causes of anti-competitive practices, namely business 
conduct that restrains competition and government policies that burden competition. The 
                                                          
178 OECD ‘Glossary for Statistical Terms’ 2014 available at 
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former includes cartels, price fixing, non-compete agreements et al; and the latter examples 
include restrictive licensing regimes for certain sectors183. 
The definitions of what constitutes anti-competitive practices within the international arena 
provided for by the OECD and UNCTAD are aligned with how national anti-competitive 
behaviour is ordinarily defined (i.e. in view of the definitions provided for by the Australian184 
Competition and Consumer Commission185 as well as the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010186; and our own Competition Act 89 of 1998187, as points of reference). 
The WTO, therefore, remains the anomaly that views international competition only in relation 
to international trade, rather than as an area of focus of its own.  
 
3.3  HOW INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION IS PRESENTLY REGULATED  
 
3.3.1 The regulation of international competition in the WTO 
 
As detailed in the previous chapter, the WTO initially set about to develop a consolidated 
international standard on the regulation of anti-competitive practices at the Ministerial 
Conference in Singapore (1996) by establishing a Working Group on the Interaction between 
Trade and Competition Policy (WGTCP). However, by the Doha Ministerial Round in 2001 
and the Cancun Ministerial Round in 2003, little progress had been made in developing a 
multilateral framework and no consensus could be reached between members. In August 
2004, the General Council elected to focus instead on the ‘other issues’ covered in the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) and work on an international competition policy was thus 
abandoned.188 The WTO recognises the importance of a single standard of competition 
regulation, especially due to the complementary relationship between trade and competition 
and the understanding that anti-competitive practices can lead to distorted markets. However, 
it appears that certain issues, including agricultural subsidies, industrial tariffs and non-tariff 
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barriers and trade remedies have, by consensus between members, been deemed more of a 
priority than competition.189190 
The WTO, however, still governs anti-competitive practices through its subsidiary agreements. 
These include the GATT, which consist of provisions on monopolies and exclusive service 
suppliers;191 in GATS, which also includes procedures for cooperation by WTO Members to 
mitigate against anti-competitive practices and their effect on international trade;192 with the 
latter also included in the TRIPS.193  However, Woolcock argues that the provisions included 
in WTO agreements “[…] are weak, have seldom been used and even more seldom used with 
success […]”.194 It is for this reason that an overarching set of principles is required.  
 
3.3.2  The role of the OECD and UNCTAD in the regulation of international competition  
3.3.2.1 OECD 
The mission of the OECD is described by the organisation as the promotion of policies to 
improve the economic and social well-being of the international community, through 
government cooperation and transparency and the recommendation of key policies.195 The 
OECD’s work, specifically in relation to cooperation in international competition, includes 
stabilising inconsistencies in the enforcement of national and bilateral competition laws; 
assistance with compliance of the competition regimes across jurisdictions; and improving the 
tools and techniques of competition authorities’ co-operation.196  
As such, the OECD provides its services to its members through its Competition Committee 
in the form of recommendations, encouraging the application of best practices and policy 
roundtable discussions197. The effect of these recommendations, however, are not binding. 
Because they are not Acts or formal policies, they have not legal implications, and thus, merely 
                                                          
189 The rationale for prioritizing these issues and delegating a special status appears to be that it 
would be a more conducive use of time to focus on removing the remaining restraints on trade for 
better market access, as more headway has already been in the respect of the negotiation of these 
issues, thus, success is more imminent. In contrast, to embark on negotiations on international 
competition is thought of as a futile, arduous task. Module 1 – Introduction to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO)’ 2012 World Trade Organisation (WTO) E-Campus at 3 – 4. 
190Module 1 – Introduction to the World Trade Organisation (WTO)’ 2012 World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) E-Campus at 3 – 4.  
191 Article II: 4 of the GATT 1947. 
192 Article IX of the GATS 1995. 
193 Article 40 of the TRIPS 1995. 
194 S Woolcock (note 11; 16). 
195 OECD ‘About the OECD’ available at http://www.oecd.org/about/, accessed on 30 June 2019.  
196 OECD ‘About the OECD’ available at http://www.oecd.org/about/, accessed on 30 June 2019. 
197 OECD ‘International Co-Operation in Competition’ available at 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/internationalco-operationandcompetition.htm, accessed on 30 June 
2019.  
39 
 
serve as guidelines. However, the OECD itself has more faith in the adoption of these 
recommendations by its Member states and declares that recommendations “[…] are not 
legally binding, but practice accords them great moral force as representing the political will of 
Member countries and there is an expectation that Member countries will do their utmost to 
fully implement a Recommendation”.198 Whilst the efforts of the OECD are well received and 
by all means better than an organisational approach, the reality is that, with a membership of 
35 countries globally,199 it cannot suffice as the primary model of multilateral cooperation within 
the competition environment. 
 
3.3.2.2  UNCTAD 
The general role of UNCTAD is to promote the integration of developing countries into the 
global economy though a forum for intergovernmental deliberations; research and policy 
analysis; and providing technical assistance to developing countries.200 
Notably, the UNCTAD has developed a Competition and Consumer Policies Programme with 
the intent to improve competition and consumer protection. The key functions of the 
Competition and Consumer Policies Programme are: 
● enabling government discussions regarding the relationship between competition 
and development,  
● international cooperation in competition law enforcement, and the effectiveness of 
competition agencies at the annual Intergovernmental Group of Experts on 
Competition Law and Policy (IGE) meeting; 
● undertaking research, policy analysis and data collection on the aforementioned 
points; and  
● assisting developing countries with the implementation of the recommendations and 
best practice models identified.201 
  
UNCTAD rightly points out that one of the key issues with international competition is that 
“[C]ompanies and supply chains are international, while competition laws and enforcement 
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agencies are primarily national”.202 The result of this is national competition authorities being 
fraught with international issues, which they are not adept at handling.203 Such international 
issues broadly include the organisations discussed below.  
3.3.3  The United Nations Set of Principles and Rules on Competition 
Through UNCTAD, the United Nations has adopted a Set of Principles and Rules on 
Competition (the Set)204. Ioannis Lianos asserts that the Set was established as a result of 
“[…] developing countries’ efforts […] to question the foundations of the international trade 
system and develop a “New International Economic Order””.205 Thus, the Set appears to be 
substantially concerned with providing economic support and development to less developed 
countries, as is the objective of UNCTAD to combat poverty by enabling developing countries 
to access the tools for economic integration.206 From December 1978 to April 1980 the United 
Nations Conference on Restrictive Business Practices (RPB) - under the auspices of 
UNCTAD- convened meetings with the intent to adopt a set of multilateral rules governing 
RBPs. The Set was adopted in 1980 and seven UN Conferences207 have taken place to review 
and, where necessary update, the content.  
The intention behind the set of rules is to eliminate RBPs adversely affecting international 
trade, and contribute to the economic development of developing countries. The UN also 
recognized that the best way to target and impede anti-competitive practices is by agreeing 
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upon multilateral equitable principles and rules. The reason for preference of multilateral- as 
opposed to regional, bilateral or cooperative- principles and rules is the belief that such rules 
would, in fact, strengthen national laws and policies and regional and bilateral relationships 
governing RBPs and, “[…] lead to improved conditions and attain greater efficiency and 
participation in international trade and development [….]”.208. In order to ensure rules are fair 
and equitable, it needs to be applied on the same basis across nations. There is little way of 
governing and ensuring this if countries each elect to create and adhere to their own set of 
rules. 209 
The principles and rules are split: those applicable to enterprises, including transnational 
enterprises; those applicable to States at national, regional and sub-regional levels; and those 
applicable at an international level. Whilst the ambit of the Set purports to address a 
multilateral form of governance of RBPs, the application of the rules indicates more of a co-
operative stance.  
In summary, the rules applicable to enterprises are as follows: i. enterprises must conform to 
the rules of the countries in which they operate; ii. enterprises conduct their operations 
transparently and disclose any information that concerns any form of RBPs; iii. enterprises 
must refrain from practice that is deemed a RBP including, but not limited to, price fixing 
agreements, collusive tendering, market or customer allocation arrangements, refusals to 
deal, below-cost pricing to eliminate competitors, discriminatory pricing or terms and 
conditions, trademark infringement et al.210 Concerning State obligations, governments must 
commit to advancing national legislation regarding RBPs; treat all enterprises fairly and 
equitably; encourage the disclosure of certain information by enterprises related to RBPs and 
also ensure the protection of said confidential information; promote transparency of both de 
facto and de jure anti-competitive policies. Internationally states must simply ensure 
compliance with the Set.211  
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3.3.4 Bilateral cooperation 
The International Competition Network (ICN), whilst not a bilateral cooperation agreement, is 
used as a model- along with the OECD recommendations and the UN Set- in the development 
of bilateral agreements. The mission statement of the ICN is: 
 “[…] to advocate the adoption of superior standards and procedures in 
 competition policy around the world, formulate proposals for procedural and 
 substantive convergence, and seek to facilitate effective international 
 cooperation to the benefit of member agencies, consumers and economies 
 worldwide.212 
Further the ICN is an avenue for competition authorities to address competition issues and 
communicate anti-competitive policies applied globally.213 The benefits of the ICN have been 
identified as the following:  
i. pre-investigation – notifications concerning activities of cartels, companies and 
markets;  
ii. during investigation – the coordination and consolidation of investigation strategies 
and efforts; and  
iii. post-investigation – the sharing of information relating to prosecution or settlement 
arrangements.214  
 
The ICN, thus, acts as a community for governments to convene and share information in the 
quest to determine the best practice.  The United States (US) is one superpower of the view 
that international regulation of competition will amount to subordination of national legislation 
and, as such, prefers unilateral application with co-operative governance, or bilateral 
application preferable. The US has concluded a total of 16 bilateral anti-trust agreements, 
including agreements with the EU; Japan; Canada; Brazil; and Australia, to name a few.215 
These agreements are largely cooperative in nature, and are usually drafted as 
Memorandums of Understanding (MOU), thus, having very little legally binding effect. Most 
agreements simply require its signatories to communicate with their respective competition 
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authorities and undertake to ensure transparency, and cooperate when anti-trust behaviours 
are investigated. The effect thus, is that effectiveness of these agreements are dependent on 
the goodwill of its signatories and that a substantial outcome is difficult to achieve where said 
signatories fail to reach consensus, as the provisions cannot be enforced.216  
Within Africa the Southern African Customs Union Agreement (2002), COMESA Competition 
Regulations (2004), and the SADC Declarations on Regional Cooperation in Competition and 
Consumer Policies (2009) regulates how member states cooperate in the area of competition 
law enforcement. The need for such agreements stemmed from the acknowledgment that, to 
tackle cross-border anti-competitive practices, regional cooperation was required.217  
It appears as though, whilst the OECD and UNCTAD are, to date, the most progressive in 
dealing with multilateral competition, the reality is with a sparse membership, and without the 
obligations that arise through WTO membership, these organisations do not have enough 
clout to compel cooperation. Stephen Woolcock, in International Competition Policy and the 
World Trade Organisation, rightly points out that the OECD rules merely serve as guidelines 
as opposed to having the effect of enforcement.218 As stated by Woolcock, “[T]he OECD rules 
were not seen as the beginning of a multilateral competition regime, but were explicitly seen 
as providing the model of bilateral co-operation between OECD members”. Woolcock further 
contends that the provisions included in the UN Set are limited and not concrete. There is no 
commitment by governments to any binding provisions, and instead the Set acts as 
recommendations.219  
Regional and bilateral cooperative agreements are a good start in the right direction, the issue 
is that the points of divergence within the various agreements can result in regulatory 
overlap.220 It has also been indicated that cooperation does not suffice where there is a serious 
difference in policy. For example, whilst the EU and the US have concluded a cooperative 
antitrust agreement, in the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas (MDD) case221 concerning a 
transnational merger, the views of the two differed. The EU sought to protect the interests of 
Airbus, its EU competitor of Boeing-MDD, against Boeing-MDD enforcing sole-sourcing 
contracts through its merger. This case illustrates that the interests of different jurisdictions 
can diverge where antitrust practices are concerned.222 What is viewed as a RBP by one state 
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to the agreement can be seen as a legitimate business practice to the other. In this instance, 
which stance overrides the other? Similarly, in the southern African region the primary 
challenges identified in enforcing co-operation is that most agencies are new and 
underdeveloped and thus need to still build capacity; the divergence of rules and approaches 
makes compatibility of methods difficult; and the difficulty in transparency due to the fear of 
the disclosure of confidential information through the sharing of information.223 
 
3.4  CRITIQUING THE ROLE OF THE WTO IN DEVELOPING A MULTILATERAL 
 COMPETITION POLICY 
 
Whilst views on whether or not a multilateral competition policy is possible and necessary 
oftentimes diverge, the opinion that the WTO is not the correct forum in which such a policy 
should be developed appears to be widely shared. According to the WTO itself, efforts on 
developing an international competition policy have ceased indefinitely.224 Initially the WTO 
established the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy 
(WGTCP) to study the issue. The findings of the study were included in the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration, however, the WTO states, “[T]he Working Group is currently inactive but the WTO 
Secretariat continues to respond to national requests for technical assistance in this area for 
the benefit of interested WTO Members and countries seeking accession to the WTO”.225  
 
3.4.1 Literature opinions 
 
In International Competition Law and Policy: A Work in Progress author Brendan Sweeney 
shares the view that an international competition regime already exists by default.226 So whilst 
no formal agreement has been signed and ratified by any nations, the fact that companies 
operate internationally means that an overlap of domestic policies unofficially serves to 
regulate competitive practices internationally. The question then is not whether an 
international competition standard must be developed but rather whether the existing standard 
must be codified.  The difficulty in codifying this standard is because states have different 
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policy needs, which is primarily contingent on their economic structure and development. The 
author does not hold a concrete view on whether the existing standard must be codified, but 
simply ends by stating that competition law is “very much a work in progress”227. However, it 
is pointed out that the current system of ‘default governance’ (or co-operative governance) 
might not stand for much longer because each country’s protectionist desires will require 
supranational oversight to ensure that commitments are honoured.228 
Hoekman and Holmes go beyond the argument of whether or not an international competition 
legislation must be developed, and also consider whether the WTO should be involved in any 
development.229 Interestingly, and of relevance to this study, is that the focus on the article is 
from the perspective of developing countries. The authors contend that any developments 
should be done independently of the WTO because market access issues as opposed to 
competition will dominate the WTO agenda holistically. Whilst national competition focuses on 
national welfare considerations, the WTO is export driven. As noted earlier, similarly the OECD 
focuses primarily on the issues of its major countries, which are focused on market access 
and merger controls, and which are also largely irrelevant to developing countries. This is not 
to say the WTO would play no role. Moreover, it is encouraged that the WTO improves its 
transparency mandate to include information on the competition policy stance applied by 
governments and to continue to provide technical assistance, as it purports to do. Whilst the 
article accepts the need for the regulation of competition, the view is that, realistically, 
international measures might be far off and, in the interim, focus should be placed on 
developing domestic laws. The divergence in interests of nations is extensive, making 
commitment to a consolidated agreement difficult to obtain. However, the idea that this will 
only suffice in the interim is key to note. As has been mentioned, the authors point out that the 
development of many national competition agendas will further complicate competition 
relations, as conflicting principles will have no overarching authority. Further, co-operation of 
national policies will not prove adequate without enforcement through a supranational body, 
as enforcement will remain uncertain and inconsistent.230  
In Trade and Competition at the WTO: Domestic Regulation and Competition Policy for Market 
Access Development231 Jiro Tamura shares Hoekman and Holmes’ view that the WTO is not 
the appropriate platform for international competition issues, and further contends that the 
WTO regulates government actions, whereas competition needs to include the regulation of 
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private business practices.232 The author also suggests that the WTO needs to be more 
occupied with addressing the inadequacies within the trade regime, rather than shifting focus 
to competition.  
Notably, the WTO has had an opportunity for more than a decade to develop international 
competition law and policy and has failed to do so. The lack of progress at the multilateral 
level is primarily as a result of the organisation’s faulting, and because of that, bilateral efforts 
have been developed to fill the gap. However, these efforts have proved to have a limited 
effect due to the differences in national policies. Whilst multilateral agreements are more 
diverse and complex in scope than bilateral agreements, the debate on a proposed code 
needs to at least be started, before the problem of one-sided standards is expounded. The 
author also agrees that whilst the WTO is not the appropriate forum, it is not entirely without 
responsibility. Because anti-competitive practices will ultimately affect market access, Tamura 
contends that the WTO should at least develop its own competition category to facilitate 
efforts.233 The mandate of the category should be focused primarily on transparency through 
the exposure of different business practices internationally and the investigation into how each 
category deals with anti-competitive behaviour. In addition the WTO should ensure each of its 
member states has competition policies which are in line with the organisation’s trade 
objectives.234  
Whilst Woolcock acknowledges that there are inherent benefits to competition being included 
in the agenda of the WTO, ultimately the author continues the trend of arguing that the WTO’s 
role in developing an international competition standard should be limited.235 In favour of WTO 
involvement is the fact that the WTO is more ‘rules-based’, the probability of compliance would 
be greater than compliance through the OECD or UNCTAD. Also, because of the interlink 
between trade and competition, it would make sense for the WTO be involved in the 
development of a competition agenda. The core principles of the WTO suggest that the role 
of the organisation should be: transparency – require member states to publish their 
competition laws and notify WTO committees, provide information on decision-making and 
application of laws (as is the general approach); and non-discrimination – ensuring foreign 
companies are treated alike and the same as national companies. Thus, the case would not 
be for the WTO to play no role at all, but for the role of the organisation to be advisory rather 
than developing and enforcing. A key challenge would be consolidating the differing needs of 
countries as a ‘one size fits all’ approach would be ill suited. Developing countries, such as 
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those found in Africa, South America and some of Asia, have especially been weary of 
adopting international policies. The reasons for this scepticism include the fact that their 
markets are too small to necessitate the expense of introducing such a policy; the fear that it 
would serve as a basis for larger international companies to overrun their national markets 
and because other areas of trade and economy were viewed as being of greater priority236. 
However, the author proposes the introduction of forms of special and differential treatment to 
developing countries, as is provided for in the WTO, to appease their concerns. These include 
– but are not limited to – flexibility in the commitments made by developing countries, including 
longer transition period, the ability to opt out of part of the commitments, and technical 
assistance.  
It is not satisfactory to hold that, by virtue of competition existing inherently through trade, 
informal competition practices are in any event adhered too. The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas 
(MDD) case is a good example of how, even where co-operation is agreed to between 
countries, where legislation is in conflict, each country will favour its own standard and 
application. Because the WTO – or any other organisation – has failed to construct a 
multilateral approach, international competition is now fragmented.237 This is reason enough 
for a more robust approach. The fact that it would impose financial burdens on countries, 
especially developing countries, is a poor argument. Smaller countries actually stand to benefit 
from an international standard because it would protect their interests against anti-competitive 
behaviour by large dominant firms. Developing countries have less capacity and resources to 
discipline anti-competitive practices nationally, and could benefit from the support of the 
international community.238 Further, the need for the regulation of competitive practices 
warrants the expense. As has been implemented in the WTO, to alleviate the burden on 
developing countries, more developed countries can provide technical support and a flexible 
approach, especially because the development of such a policy stands to serve a greater 
good. Where the markets of developing countries are protected against anti-competitive 
practices, the firms of developed countries trading within those countries stand to benefit from 
the protection too.  
The role of the WTO should be limited most prudently because the multilateral body despite 
ample time has failed to develop a competition policy that promotes trade, while addressing 
the concerns of developing countries, and how opening the markets further exposes them. 
Further, talks on competition within the Doha Agenda have indefinitely ceased and it is safe 
to say that it is unlikely that the organisation will consider competition anytime soon. In the 
                                                          
236 S Woolcock (note 7 above; 39 – 41). 
237 B Sweeney (note 16 above; 12).  
238 B Hoekman and PS Holmes (note 9 above; 15.)  
48 
 
meantime, however, national policies are being developed and regional and bilateral 
competition agreements are being entered into. Whilst the benefit of this is that anti-
competitive practices are not continuing entirely unregulated, the risk is a convolution of 
standards, each with different and conflicting effects.  
However, the WTO can be looked to as a model. The major concern is that a single 
competition standard is not possible to achieve, however, decades ago the same was 
assumed about a single trade standard. The development of the WTO was years in the 
making, and still today requires improvement, but it shows that multilateral cooperation is 
possible. Therefore, whilst a multilateral agreement or organisation will not, realistically, be 
developed overnight, it is imperative that the matter be addressed with urgency.  
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Because of the intricate relationship between trade and competition- as highlighted throughout 
this paper- the more steps the WTO takes to liberalize trade, the more international 
competition will increase. Naturally, the increase in international competition will lead to anti-
competitive practices. Without these practices being monitored, regulated and prevented, the 
work of the WTO stands at risk of being undone239. However, that being said, whilst trade and 
competition shares a comparative goal of economic liberalization, it is not the same. For this 
reason, it cannot be regulated in the same manner nor by the same organisation240.  
The WTO should work co-operatively with whichever organisation is tasked with developing a 
multilateral competition policy, but it should not be tasked with developing the policy itself for 
the following reasons:  
i. the regulation of international competition has remained on the agenda of the WTO 
for a number of years without much progress being made, therefore, keeping the 
WTO in the forefront will likely result in in stagnation241;  
ii. trade and competition, and a number of their key objectives, are in many respects too 
divisive to be regulated singularly242; and 
iii. an international competition policy can have the effect of allowing countries to combat 
any anti-competitive implications that are resultant of their WTO obligations243. 
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It is for this reason that, whilst the WTO should play an advisory role in the development of a 
multilateral competition framework policy, the development of said policy should not be within 
the auspice of the organisation. This definition in itself demonstrates the discord between how 
the WTO addresses international competition relations in comparison to how domestic policies 
seek to remedy anti-competitive practices. Thus, chapter four will look specifically at South 
Africa and the extent to which a consistent international competition standard may affect its 
development.   
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
SOUTH AFRICA’S PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION AND THE 
‘PROUDLY SOUTH AFRICAN’ CAMPAIGN 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This Chapter first seeks to unpack South Africa’s trade obligations and trade relations before 
determining how these relate to its stance on competition practices. Following the 1994 
democratic election, South Africa still had a long way to go to counter the effects of being 
ostracized from the international community because of the apartheid regime. The country 
attempted to remedy its strained relations, following the release from the various embargos, 
by joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and becoming an active GATT Member State.  
To do so, South Africa had to commit to radical reform to bring its market practices in line with 
that of the WTO expectations as, until that point, it had operated in an isolated fashion, with 
closed markets. Whilst the benefit of re-joining the international community- in many respects, 
including trade- was evident, this also meant that the opening of its market would expose the 
country to international competition, which, until this point, it had been sheltered from. With 
the rapid development of its trade policies, South Africa also needed to improve its competition 
policies to protect its now exposed economy from anti-competitive practices.  
Against the brief backdrop, this chapter firstly discusses the focused country, South Africa, 
signing of the Marrakesh Agreement of 1994, and its renewed involvement and active 
participation in the GATT Rounds of Negotiations- particularly the Uruguay Round- before 
discussing the development of the country’s existing competition legislation. In addition, the 
chapter will discuss its cooperative competition commitments. Finally, the Chapter considers 
the Proudly South African campaign and logo, including a brief consideration of its purpose 
and effects and how this relates to South Africa’s GATT commitments. 
 
4.2 SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION (WTO) 
 
From 1991, South Africa’s apartheid system began showing cracks- as a result of heavy 
internal and external pressures- and in anticipation of the end of the apartheid regime, the 
country began considering the importance and benefit of regional and international economic 
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and trade co-operation244. The appeal to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO) community 
was attractive for South Africa, given the benefits of being a WTO member. Given its wide 
membership, the organisation indisputably has a substantial economic impact on both its 
members, and even those excluded from the organisation. As such, it is plausible to argue 
that it is not in the best interests of any country- particularly not developing countries- to not 
be included within the cocoon of protection afforded by the WTO. Through the organisation, 
alliance with other members ensures economic and political benefit, particularly through 
increased market access. At the time, for South Africa, in particular, involvement in the WTO 
would mean a means of rectifying it has tarnished, pariah state, as resultant of the apartheid 
government. Further, through the WTO, the country has a means of improving its international 
status by showing good citizenship and responsible leadership. Negotiations between South 
Africa and the organisation began in 1994, in the new democratic era, and South Africa 
officially became a WTO member on 1 January 1995. In 1996 the new government introduced 
the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme in 1996. GEAR is a strategy 
designed to restructure a country’s economic activities to achieve an increase in employment 
prospects, a redistribution of the country’s resources, an improvement of basic socio-
economic facilities, including health and education, and overall an advancement of the state’s 
duty to realize the basic human needs of its civilians.245 The country pledged allegiance to the 
WTO’s trade liberalisation agenda to endorse an export growth strategy to remedy the effect 
on the economy from the previous sanctions placed.246  
However, despite fairly recent WTO membership, South Africa has been a signatory to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) since 1948, and was one of the twenty three 
founding members, regarded as a developed country according to GATT standards (i.e. not 
subject to special and differential treatment). However, as mentioned above, the country’s 
controversial political regime led to years of isolation from the multilateral trading system.247 
Thus, the GATT Council conducted a Trade Policy Review of South Africa in 1993.248 The 
trade policy review mechanism (or the TPRM) of the GATT enables its Council “[…] to conduct 
a collective review of the full range of trade policies and practices of each GATT member at 
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regular periodic intervals to monitor significant trends and developments which may have an 
impact on the global trading system”.   
Despite being a signatory since 1948, this was the first time the country had been subject to 
such a review. The critique of South African trade system is that the tariff structure was too 
complex, and not binding and transparent; barriers to trade were prevalent, especially in the 
agriculture sector; and overall the system showed high levels of protectionist practices. Whilst 
the Council still took into account the fact that the country was burdened with political 
uncertainty at the time the review was conducted, the South African government still made a 
commitment to reviewing its existing policy to bring it in line with the standards of the GATT 
and the WTO249. In summary, the GATT Secretariat encouraged South Africa to align its 
trading system with that recognised by the GATT members, especially as the sanctions placed 
by the international community were now largely dismantled, allowing the country to undergo 
significant transformation.250 
Following the 1993 review, South Africa became involved in the Uruguay Round of 
Negotiations and experienced pressure from other GATT members to liberalise its trade 
policies, especially since it had done little to comply with its GATT obligations until this point, 
relying on the guise of international sanctions and large separation from the international 
community.251 As a result, South Africa was faced with an ultimatum- change or face the 
consequences of retaliation.252 Following years of conducting its trade outside the disciplines 
of the GATT, South Africa elected to comply. This led to the signing of the Marrakesh 
Agreement on of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (or the WTO Agreement) in 
December 1994 and the country’s ultimate ascension to the WTO in January 1995.253  
Despite its ostracism from the international community, South Africa still participated in every 
GATT Round of Negotiations; however, its role was merely a formality and it hardly adhered 
to the trade and tariff concessions negotiated on.254 The Uruguay Round was different. Given 
its desire to be welcomed back into the international trade system and to be accepted into the 
WTO, South Africa took its commitment to the Uruguay Round serious255. The Uruguay Round 
itself is recognised as the most ambitious Round of the GATT history, as it tackled new trade 
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issues, including the incorporation of trade in agriculture and textiles, trade in services, 
intellectual property and competition. This caused contention amongst member states as 
developing countries prioritized the former, whilst developed countries were more concerned 
with the latter. The fear of developing countries was that developed countries would use their 
resources and power to strong-arm developing countries into agreeing to their proposals whilst 
not making any concessions in favour of developing countries.256 In the end, developing 
countries felt short-changed. Their belief is that they had made a number of concessions and 
were at a disadvantage as they did not have the expertise to substantively take part in 
negotiations. In turn, whilst developed countries did agree to liberalize trade in agriculture, the 
introduction of a host of new issues left developing countries feeling like the results delivered 
were not meaningful to them.  
During the Uruguay Round, South Africa attempted to have its developed country status 
changed to that of a developing country, which would enable it to rely on certain flexibilities. 
However, this was opposed by the US, Japan and other major countries, and instead South 
Africa was deemed a transitional economy, which allowed it a certain degree of flexibility in 
implementing trade reforms.257 However, given its ostracism from trade negotiations for a 
substantial period, South Africa entered the round of negotiations overwhelmed and barely 
able to keep up with negotiating issues. As a result, it had very little negotiating power or 
influence over the outcome of the Round. Ultimately, South Africa agreed to a five-year tariff 
reform, with industries such as textiles, clothing and automotive affording an exception of eight 
years. South Africa’s commitment to the Uruguay Round showed the international community 
that it was serious about trade and economic reform.258 
Whilst its entry back into the international trade market through the Uruguay Round and WTO 
membership was beneficial to South Africa’s dwindling economy, it was not without benefit to 
the WTO as well. Given South Africa’s fluidity as a ‘transitional economy’, it has ties to both 
developing and developed countries and has been able to act as a conduit between the two, 
particularly in Africa, where South Africa has largely maintained the strongest economy and 
infrastructure.259 Even though the WTO has been reluctant to rid South Africa of its developed 
country status, much of its aspirations within the organisation- such as a focus on reducing 
tariff barriers in the textile and agricultural industries- mirror that of developing countries.260 It 
has long been argued that developing countries have very little contribution to WTO trade 
concessions, and South Africa is no exception. Despite this, however, South Africa has still 
                                                          
256 M Soko (note 253 above; 7 – 8).  
257 M Soko (note 253 above; 9). 
258 M Soko (note 253 above; 10 – 12).  
259 D Lee (note 246 above; 2).  
260 D Lee (note 246 above; 2 – 3). 
54 
 
had relative success in the informal- or ‘green room’- meetings at the Seattle Ministerial 
Conference in 1999, as well as the mini-ministerial meetings between the Singapore, Doha 
and Cancun Ministerial Conferences. South Africa has even gone as far as acting as the 
‘green man’ (or ‘Friend of the Chair’) at the Doha Ministerial Conference, where South Africa’s 
then Minister of Trade and Industry, Alec Erwin, chaired meetings on policy-making in the 
WTO.261 
 
4.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA  
 
Following the changes made to its international trade relations as part of its new democratic 
state, South Africa’s focus also changed to improving its existing competition law and policy. 
Whilst trade was centred on integration back into the international community, competition 
was focused more locally, concerned with rectifying the wrongs of the apartheid government, 
more specifically economic distortions and lack of development for the majority. Thus, 
economic efficiency is at the core of the country’s objectives.262  
The new government had a challenging task ahead, addressing poverty, unemployment and 
a wealth and resource distribution distortion. An attempt to remedy the economic injustices of 
the part was done in part by reformulating the competition legislation, namely the introduction 
of legislation such as the Competition Act 89 of 1998, and its subsequent amendments.263 In 
its consolidated form, these Acts have established three agencies, namely the Competition 
Commission, the Competition Tribunal and the Competition Appeal Court. The responsibility 
of these agencies is to enforce and regulate the laws laid out in the corresponding Acts. In 
summary, the Act has a political scope, in that it attempts to develop small and medium-sized 
enterprises and ensure a broader distribution of ownership to remedy the income and wealth 
disparity amongst South Africans.264 More in line with general competition provisions, the Act 
also addresses the abuse of power by dominant firms,265 price discrimination266, the regulation 
of mergers267 and restricted agreements.268  
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Of the competition agencies, the role of the Competition Commission is that of an investigator, 
and addresses concerns regarding restrictive agreements and practices, the abuse of 
dominant positions and unfair mergers.269 The existing Competition Commission differs from 
its predecessor, the Competition Board, which existed under the Maintenance and Promotion 
of Competition Act 96 of 1979, as the Competition Commission acts independently from the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), whereas the Competition Board operated as an 
administrative board within the Department of Trade and Industry. In addition, 
recommendations would previously be made to the Minister of Trade and Industry, with whom 
the power to make the final decision vested.270 Now the decision-making authority is the 
Competition Tribunal, based on referrals made following the investigations of the Competition 
Commission.271 The complainant can also refer complaints directly to the Competition 
Tribunal, if the Commission makes a decision of non-referral.272 The responsibility of the 
Competition Appeal Court is to confirm, set aside or amend any decision or order made by the 
Competition Commission or Tribunal and referred to it for appeal or review.273 
As discussed in brief in Chapter 3, one of the primary roles of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development (OECD) is a review of the existing competition policies of both 
its members and some non-members.274 The purpose of the review is to create a dialogue 
between national competition authorities in different jurisdictions to foster transparency and 
promote global co-operation.275 As such, in 2003 South Africa undertook to be subject to a 
peer review by sixty of its peers.276 From the outset, it was acknowledged that what made the 
peer review of South Africa particularly interesting is its diverse market. Regarded as a middle 
market, the South African economic position is difficult to classify, as explained earlier.   This 
is because the South African economy is regarded as the strongest in Africa, and continues 
to expand through its natural resources, such as diamonds and gold. However, in many 
respects the country still has a floundering economy, based in part on its previous isolation 
from the international trade and economic industry also on its history of central ownership (with 
the apartheid government owning more than 40% of the country’s enterprises during its era) 
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and its unequal distribution of wealth and income.277 The peer review distinguishes six key 
goals prevalent in the Competition Act278, namely: 
 
(i.) “[…] the efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy”,  
(ii.) consumer welfare,  
(iii.) socio-economic welfare, including increased employment,  
(iv.) participation in the global market,  
(v.) participation of SMEs in the economy, and  
(vi.) the inclusion of the historically disadvantaged in ownership.  
 
In summary, the Act is primarily concerned with rectifying inequity and inefficiency.279 
Businesses have appealed to the new government to relax its stance towards competitive 
practices to ensure the world markets are now opened to them, but the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI) contended that a stronger domestic stance towards competition would 
prepare the country for an international competition policy.280 Instead, competition would be 
encouraged so as to promote foreign investment in local firms and liberalize trade.281 In 
addition to the areas of competition covered by the Act, and as discussed above, the Act also 
allows certain exemptions from its prohibitions.282 An exemption can be granted by the 
Commission for a specified term and is applicable to restrictive business practices or abuse 
of dominance. However, this is not left to the discretion of the Commission, but is rather subject 
to an investigation, where it is determined whether the conditions, as set out, are met. 
Ultimately, the peer review encourages better transparency, such as public comment and 
notices, to ensure special interest and protection is afforded to certain groups and industries, 
especially because the exemption procedure itself is broad and allows an act that would 
ordinarily be a violation to meet the requirements of and qualify for an exemption.283  
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4.4 SOUTH AFRICA’S BILATERAL COMPETITION AGREEMENTS AND PARTICIPATION 
IN GLOBAL CO-OPERATION 
As alluded above, the  Competition Act is South Africa’s national legislation regulating 
competition practices, however, it has some extra-jurisdictional effect as it not only regulates 
activity within the Republic, but also activity that has an effect within the Republic284. In addition 
the Act instructs the application and consideration of foreign and international law in its 
interpretation.285   
However, outside of its national legislation, South Africa also has regional and bilateral 
relationships governing its competition stance with other states. Within Africa, South Africa is 
already party to the Southern African Development Community (SADC)286 and the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU)287, which, in essence, governs cross-border investment and 
intra-regional trade activities. Thus, this requires competition law and policy too not only cover 
national activities, but to also be regional in character. Both the SADC and the SACU 
acknowledge this need for regional co-operation in order to address anti-competitive practices 
by multinational firms that can have a cross-border effect, even if it is effected within a single 
jurisdiction.288   
Further, the SADC Trade Protocol requires member states to “[…] implement measures within 
the Community that prohibit unfair business practices and promote competition”.289 Pursuant 
to Article 25 of the SADC Trade Protocol, in 2009 the member states signed the SADC 
Declaration on Regional Co-operation in Competition and Consumer Policies “to prohibit unfair 
business practices and to promote competition and co-operation in the region”.290 As per the 
SADC, “[T]he Declaration encourages Member States to establish a transparent framework 
that contains appropriate safeguards to protect confidential information of the parties, and 
appropriate national judicial review”.291 Thus, priority is given to those Member States that do 
not yet have an existing competition authority, with the Community being responsible for aiding 
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with said development. In addition, the SADC Secretariat established a Competition and 
Consumer Policy and Law Committee responsible for the oversight of Member State co-
operation so as to unite the laws and policies of each State.292 Likewise, in 2002 the SACU 
developed the SACU Agreement in terms of which Article 40 states:  
1. Member States agree that there shall be competition policies in each Member 
State. 2. Member States shall co-operate with each other with respect to the 
enforcement of competition laws and regulations 
However, according to Viljoen, whilst the provisions existed, compliance with these provisions 
did not.293 In 2015 South Africa and Namibia entered into a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU)294 in terms of which co-operation in bilateral competition would be formalised and made 
consistent with their own national laws. Thus, the MOU provides that when both Namibia and 
South Africa undertake an investigation in terms of their own national law, but which has an 
effect on the other member, they commit to cooperating “[…] to the extent that is appropriate 
and practicable […]”.295 Article 4 of the MOU includes a list of co-operation activities, including 
exchange of information, co-operation in investigations, transparency in stances on 
substantive policy issues296 et al. Similarly then, Kenya followed suite and signed an MOU297 
with South Africa as well, showing the propensity for bilateral competition to not simply be 
limited to a provision or undertaking included in the SADC and SACU Protocol and Agreement, 
with no real effect, but an undertaking that Member States have come to understand and 
appreciate the importance of.  
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Globally the South African Competition Commission has also recently concluded MOUs with 
the European Commission (EC)298 and with BRICS.299 Like the Namibian MOU, the purpose 
of these agreements is to “develop and strengthen co-operation in the field of competition law 
and policy”300. However, none of these MOUs appear to take into account and address which 
policy will be given preference where there is a divergence in effect of application of the two. 
This is especially concerning for the BRICS MOU, where the policies of four different states 
must be accounted for. Thus, as the MOUs tend to spell out, they are only as enforceable to 
the extent that is possible301. This is evidenced by the wording of the MOUs, such as South 
African – Namibian MOU which states that the provisions of the MOU are not intended “[…] to 
create any legal rights or obligations under international law302”. The South African – Kenyan 
MOU further states that the discretion to decide whether to undertake enforcement of the 
provisions lies with the respective parties303. All of the MOUs provide that, where there is 
inconsistency between the provisions of the MOU and the domestic laws of the signatories, 
the domestic laws will prevail304. Thus, the MOUs have no binding effect, and are based on 
co-operative compliance. 
In summary, these MOUs provide an understanding upon which their signatories make the 
following commitments for the enforcement of international competition regulation: 
i. Promoting transparency through the exchange of national competition policies, 
laws and rules, and the sharing of any non-confidential information and views 
concerning competition policy enforcement and development305; 
ii. Reasonable cooperation, subject to their respective national laws and policies, in 
investigations and prosecutions for anti-competitive practices committed within 
their respective borders306; 
                                                          
298 Memorandum of Understanding between the Directorate-General Competition of the European 
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iii. Promoting participation in international conferences and seminars related to 
competition issues, and working to develop research in the field of competition law 
enforcement307; and  
iv. The review of all cross-border mergers and cross-border activities308 
 
4.5 THE PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF THE ‘PROUDLY SOUTH AFRICAN’ CAMPAIGN 
The Proudly South African (SA) campaign was launched in 2001 and later, in line with it, the 
Local Procurement Accord was established in October 2011 by representatives of local 
businesses and the South African government. The aim of the Accord is to foster job creation 
by improving localisation by 75% by 2022.309 The Accord itself is split into a number of 
commitments by both the public and private sectors, including: 
4.5.1 Commitment by government 
1. leveraging public procurement, by amending the Preferential Procurement Policy 
Framework Act 5 of 2000 (hereafter referred to as the PPPFA) to include a designated 
quota of resources and services to be procured by the government and its entities 
within each industry;310 
2. to establish necessary standards for measurement and verification of local 
content;311 and 
3. localisation commitments in infrastructure procurement.312 
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309 Department of Economic Development Local Procurement Accord Publication 2011 available at 
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310 Department of Economic Development Local Procurement Accord Publication 2011 available at 
file:///C:/Users/A/Downloads/Accord_Procure.pdf, accessed on 01 July 2019 at 8.  
311 Department of Economic Development Local Procurement Accord Publication 2011 available at 
file:///C:/Users/A/Downloads/Accord_Procure.pdf, accessed on 01 July 2019 at 8 – 9. 
312 Department of Economic Development Local Procurement Accord Publication 2011 available at 
file:///C:/Users/A/Downloads/Accord_Procure.pdf, accessed on 01 July 2019 at 10. 
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4.5.2 Commitment by businesses 
1. the support for local manufacturing;313 
2. investment and funding in domestic manufacturing sectors;314 
3. complementing state procurement policies and strategies315; and 
4. analysing and reviewing their supply chain activities316. 
 
4.5.3 Commitment by organised labour  
1. to promote local procurement;317 
2. “[…] to align the investment philosophies, strategies and mandates of their pension 
funds to advance local procurement […]”;318 and 
3. to engage in shareholder and corporate governance activism.319 
 
4.5.4 Commitment by community constituencies 
1. to create awareness and social mobilisation of local procurement;320 and  
2. commit to strengthen social economy enterprises through participation in supply 
chains.321 
 
 
                                                          
313 Department of Economic Development Local Procurement Accord Publication 2011 available at 
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4.5.5 Overall commitments  
1. to partner with the ‘Proudly South Africa’ campaign;322 and  
2. to implement the Accord.323 
 
The aim of the Proudly South African campaign is to in essence spread the Local Procurement 
Accord to the community by encouraging consumers to buy and source local goods and 
services. The purpose is naturally to bring money into the South African economy. Thus, local 
businesses are encouraged to mark their products with the Proudly SA logo- the registered 
trademark of the campaign, which is the South African flag in a circular shape with a tick - to 
make them identifiable to consumers. Not only does the campaign encourage support of local 
produce, it also ensures that goods that bear the logo observe environmental standards and 
the enterprise follows fair labour practices. Thus the qualifying requirements of the campaign 
are:  
1. The production and manufacturing of the product must be at least 50% local and 
any imported materials must have undergone a “substantial transformation”; 
2. The product or service must be of a high quality, as approved by the regulatory 
bodies of that particular industry; 
3. The South African labour legislation and labour practices must be complied with; 
and  
4. The South African environmental standards must be adhered to.324 
Due to financial challenges and budgetary constraints, the true effect of the campaign has not 
been determined. Thus, there is, to date, no way of determining whether the campaign has, 
in fact, benefitted the South African economy and achieved the desired result.325 However, a 
general study of the effect of country of origin markings indicates that such markings might 
not achieve the intended effect as, rather than being swayed to purchase locally, consumers 
from developing countries tend to associate products sourced from developed countries as 
                                                          
322 Department of Economic Development Local Procurement Accord Publication 2011 available at 
file:///C:/Users/A/Downloads/Accord_Procure.pdf, accessed on 01 July 2019 at 21. 
323 Department of Economic Development Local Procurement Accord Publication 2011 available at 
file:///C:/Users/A/Downloads/Accord_Procure.pdf, accessed on 01 July 2019 at 22. 
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on 30 June 2019. 
325 Parliamentary Monitoring Group Meeting Report of meeting held on 19 June 2007 available at 
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being of a better quality.326 Still, there are some countries- both developed and developing- 
that, owing to patriotism, tend to support local production.327 Thus, the study finds that 
“understanding the guidelines that consumers use when evaluating the quality of products and 
making purchasing decisions is imperative to manufacturers of consumer products and 
marketers”328. This indicates that the Proudly SA campaign might have been premature and 
that the initiators of the campaign might have faired better by marketing and promoting the 
purchasing of local products to seduce consumers to source local before investing money into 
the campaign itself. However, this does not conclude that the campaign itself is fruitless; on 
the contrary, it could in fact create the result desired and thus serve as a much needed boost 
to South Africa’s economy.  
Whilst the GATT does not contain any specific rules concerning country of origin markings, 
and instead contending that each country is free to determine its own criterion surrounding 
how goods entering their markets must be marked. The purpose of this flexible approach is to 
minimise the already stringent formalities assigned to imports.329 However, the problem with 
this approach is that it seems to not take into account that rules of origin can, inherently, be 
contradictory to the GATT’s national treatment principle. By endorsing a campaign that 
encourages consumers to source local goods, GATT members can be guilty of not treating 
foreign and national goods equally. In fact, there have already been conflicts of opinion 
amongst members about the limitation of country of origin markings, and the view that the 
WTO and GATT should regulate the format of these markings has so far gone unheeded.330 
 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
South Africa has come a long way in its attempts to remedy the burdens and effects of its 
history. Having reinforced its GATT commitments and signed on to the WTO Agreement, the 
country appreciates that one of the ways in which it can improve its economical state is by 
being involved in the international trade regime. However, with that involvement comes 
increased competition. Moreover, whilst competition is generally endorsed for a healthy, 
developing economy, anti-competitive behaviour can have the effect of undoing the progress 
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already made. South Africa has attempted to manage this by improving its own national 
competition policy and interlinked competition authority; however, this only has the effect of 
regulating competition within the Republic. Its numerous bilateral competition agreements are 
also very limited in application and success because they operate in a cooperative fashion. 
Thus, these agreements rely on the goodwill of their signatories in faithfully applying their 
provisions, as opposed to them being enforced. The result is that, where the application of the 
national policies of each signatory conflicts, it is only natural to infer that each country will elect 
a protectionist approach, rather than a harmonious one. This means that cooperative 
agreements are unstable and uncertain in effect.  
Whilst the Proudly South African campaign is another admirable way for the country to attempt 
to boost its domestic economy, it, too, is not without uncertainty. The risk is that the campaign 
can either have the adverse intended of detracting the support of consumers who only trust 
international quality of goods, as opposed to supporting local. In addition, whilst the GATT and 
WTO appear to take a fairly lax approach to rules of origin, given the criticism of the lack of 
structure, it could take a stronger stance in forcing its Member States to adhere to an approach 
that is line with its national treatment policy.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In concluding this paper, this chapter reverts to the original research questions, namely how 
is the regulation of competition and trade related within the international community; how are 
the shortfalls concerning the regulation of competition within the international community being 
addressed; what should the WTO’s involvement be in addressing these shortfalls; and finally, 
does South Africa’s stance to the regulation of competition comply with its obligations in terms 
of the WTO? Is the ‘Proudly South African’ logo and campaign in conformance with the WTO’s 
National Treatment Policy? 
Finally, recommendations are made concerning how the shortfall in the international regulation 
of competition should be addressed and what role of the WTO should be limited to in this 
regard.  
 
5.2 THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMPETITION 
5.2.1 International Trade Framework (The General Agreement on Tariffs, Trade 
(GATT), and the formation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
The adoption of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the later formation 
of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), has heralded an unprecedented interaction within the 
international community. As noted, following the Great Depression resultant of the World 
Wars, nations realized that a variable system – or lack thereof – regulating trade relations was 
not effective331. What initially began as negotiations to reduce tariffs and open markets, has 
since evolved into an organisation responsible for removing barriers to trade; regulation labour 
standards and relations; means of economic development; removing antidumping and 
countervailing duties; developing free trade areas332 et al.  
The WTO achieved success through its many Rounds of Negotiations, including the original 
Geneva Round that led to the signing of the GATT in 1947;333 the development of many 
subsidiary GATT Agreements.334 However, these successes were not without fall backs, 
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including lack of consensus between contracting parties, particularly between developed and 
developing countries. The GATT faced many criticisms during the Tokyo, Uruguay and Doha 
Rounds, including the lack of coverage of issues concerning developing countries and the 
time it took to reach any consensus.335 Given the challenges experienced in trade issues, it is 
no wonder negotiations on competition were never made priority. Whilst the topic was 
broached during the Uruguay336 and Singapore Rounds,337 it was only during the Doha Round 
(or the Doha Development Agenda) that it was officially included on the agenda. However, 
even this was unsuccessful.338 For the Member States, it was imperative that development 
remain the primary focus of the negotiations and, as a result, topics such as agriculture, 
intellectual property and the development of international services took priority over 
international competition issues.339  
 
5.2.2 International Competition 
Despite the WTO’s seeming reluctance to delve into the establishment of an international 
competition organisation, it is becoming apparent that the need for one is mounting. 
International trade itself boosts competition and competitive practices, making the regulation 
of these practices essential.340 Even outside of international trade, there exists a lapse in the 
regulation of competition internationally. As identified in the earlier chapters, currently 
competition is regulated through bilateral cooperation in the form of agreements between 
countries, or through compliance with the provisions endorsed by a few regulatory bodies.341  
The flaws in this approach are plentiful. Firstly, there lacks uniformity.342 With co-operative 
agreements, countries are permitted and able to form their own way of governance and dictate 
their approach, within the confines of the agreement, to competition. Whilst this protects 
sovereignty, it does very little to improve the current standard whereby competition is 
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‘ungoverned’ within the international sphere.343 International trade law indicates that 
oftentimes a self-serving approach must be set aside in favour of an approach that benefits 
the masses. In other words, state sovereignty might protect a country’s ability to dictate laws 
that it feels are most appropriate for its socio-economic environment, but poses threats to 
other countries that interact with it, especially if said laws are in direct contrast to what the 
other country directs on their own home soil.344 Further, the protection derived from 
sovereignty is limited345. Ultimately, where a country’s approach does not fit the desired mould 
of most others, that country exposes itself to the threat of exclusion. Thus, the pressure to 
conform to a universal standard- as opposed to protecting one’s own interest- becomes 
difficult to resist.346 
 
5.3 ADDRESSING THE SHORTFALLS IN THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMPETITTION 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the manner in which competition is currently being regulated is 
either through the implementation of domestic competition laws and policies, or through co-
operative agreements between states. For reasons that will be expanded upon below, neither 
has proved wholly successful. The final suggested method is through the implementation of a 
unilateral competition agreement.  
 
5.3.1 The implementation of domestic laws  
Whilst the regulation of competition has continued to expand over time, as set out in chapter 
1, there are still those countries, which have failed to introduce any form of governance where 
competition is concerned. As a result of resource constraints, developing and least developed 
countries are primarily devoid of any national competition laws and policies.  
Their political environment also oftentimes limits these countries. The first reason for this is, 
whilst the regulation of competitive practices might have a socio-economic benefit, not all are 
in favour of competition being governed. As identified in chapter 1, a strong competition policy 
has the result of preventing monopolistic enterprises from retaining the market by denying rival 
access and firms cannot unilaterally determine prices as consumer interests must be 
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accounted for. Depending on the might of the resistance, governments might experience 
difficulty in any attempts at what would be perceived as altering the status quo, thus, might 
deem it not worth it to upset these firms, leaving competition largely unregulated347.  
Another concern, however, also discussed in chapter 1, is that developing countries just do 
not have the resources and capacity required to not only develop an anti-competitive 
agreement, but also to enforce it. It is important to establish a regulatory body that offers 
enough authority to sway actors from engaging in prohibited practices. As stated by Dr Michael 
Gal in The Ecology of Antitrust Preconditions for Competition Law Enforcement in Developing 
Countries348:  
 The higher the possibility of detection and sanctioning, the stronger the deterrence 
 effects on market participants […] Regulation by deterrence should be the main course 
 of antitrust enforcement, as it is much more efficient than direct regulation of conduct 
 in limiting anti-competitive conduct.349 
A number of developing countries also do not view competition regulation as important. The 
consensus is that countries with smaller economies are already overwhelmed with more 
pressing issues, such as agriculture and trade, intellectual property rights, globalization and 
its impact on human rights and environmental policies. Thus, anti-competitive policies are 
deprioritized in favour of these issues. The research found that, what seems to not be taken 
into account is that competition oftentimes has a direct bearing on developing country 
economies. As such, most international competition policies cover areas such as anti-dumping 
practices, international cartels, cross-border market mergers and agreements, all of which 
have a direct effect on developing countries. Thus, developing countries should be weary of 
disregarding competition regulation as an issue that has no real bearing on them.350  
 
5.3.2 Bilateral and multilateral co-operative competition agreements 
Chapter 4 discussed the recent surge in co-operative competition agreements, as a means of 
bridging the gap of non-governance. In summary, the effect of these agreements are of little 
force as they rely on “gentlemanly compliance” as opposed to any means of enforcement.351 
There appear to be no consequences for lack of compliance and most agreements, in fact, 
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state that they are not intended to be binding in nature; and that any difference between the 
provisions of the agreement and any existing national policies of the parties or obligations in 
terms of any international laws will mean the national and international laws will prevail.  
Almost as a means of finding a medium between no international regulation and the criticism 
of over regulation, countries have tended to steer towards entering into bilateral agreements. 
While this at least offers some protection, its success is questionable. As previously 
discussed,352 the major issue with bilateral agreements is that its enforcement is literal. These 
agreements are entered into as a ‘cooperation’ effort, meaning countries must exhibit good 
intention in order for it to garner any success. This might initially prove sufficient, however, 
where countries have conflicting approaches, it is inevitable that a stalemate will be reached. 
Without an authority that would force either side to concede, countries can simply elect to 
ignore the enforcement of any provision that does not work in their favour. In other words, 
cooperation rarely suffices where there is a serious difference in policy.353 
Regulatory overlap also poses an issue where a number of bilateral cooperation agreements 
exist, all in conflict with each other. Similar to the “spaghetti bowl phenomenon” experienced 
in free trade arrangements (FTAs),354 having multiple existing cooperative agreements will 
simply lead to a complicated entanglement of differing views and approaches and will allow 
countries to cherry pick competition policies that might be discriminatory and welfare reducing 
in effect.355  Thus, while bilateral cooperation agreements are at least a step in the right 
direction, they are unlikely to achieve long-term success, and might, in fact hinder progress 
by complicating negotiations.  
 
5.4 THE ROLE OF THE WTO IN DEVELOPING AN INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 
POLICY 
5.4.1 The concerns of developing countries 
From a developing country perspective, the international regulation of competition is seen as 
yet another means of wealthier, more powerful countries forming a platform to dictate their 
preferred model.356 This is the bitterness that has been borne of the WTO itself. The same 
should be said about the pressure to conform to an international standard of regulating 
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competition; however, such pressure has been scarce. As stated above, countries- and in 
particular ones of smaller economies- feel the pressure to accept and conform to international 
standards of trade for fear of being left out, but this is not to say that the standard adopted is 
to their benefit. It appears to be a matter of selecting the lesser of two evils- defy international 
pressure and face complete exclusion, or give in to the pressure and adopt competition 
policies that are not necessarily advantageous to their own country’s economy.357 
The main criticism that appears to be made is that, for 17 years, and 6 rounds of negotiations, 
the WTO members have made removing trade barriers, ensuring tariff concessions and 
opening markets a priority. This is primarily beneficial to their own economies. Through open 
markets and reducing trade barriers, firms in developed countries can expand into 
international territories; in other words, improve foreign investment. This in turn motivates 
exports of produce, machinery and other capital goods. It also improves employment within 
the economy as foreign investment expands enterprises, which in turn creates the need for 
more jobs.358 It would then logically follow that the assumption would be that the same would 
occur vice versa, and developing countries would experience these benefits too. 
Chapter 2 of this paper considers the history of developing countries that has resulted in 
reliance on western funding, creating an unequal bargaining power. As discussed, developed 
countries primarily benefit from having unlimited access to developing countries’ resources, 
making them more inclined to prefer a competition model that retains this open market, rather 
than focusing on welfare benefits. This is one of the reasons that consensus between 
developed and developing countries on international competition issues appears doubtful.359  
Another reason discussed in chapter 2 is the fear of lack of reciprocity that is meaningful. It is 
true that developed countries afford developing countries certain trade concessions; however, 
these appear to be conditional. The example previously discussed in chapter 2, the South 
Africa-USA chicken saga, serves as evidence of this. As the discussion revealed, the South 
African poultry industry could not compete with the extremely low price of the unwanted USA 
chicken being dumped, and the countries attempted to balance the impact of the alleged 
dumping by introducing tariff increases, were met with threats from the USA to exclude SA 
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from AGOA completely.360 Thus, the fear is that the same will be prevalent in any attempts to 
negotiate on issues of competition, where the WTO is the driving force.  
Given the weariness of developing countries, such as South Africa, where international trade 
is concerned, it only makes sense that the same weariness has transmitted into discussions 
concerning international competition regulation. Further, developing countries are concerned 
that entertaining talks on a possible international competition agreement will only mean the 
discussions being dominated by market access issues, rather than international antitrust361. 
The agenda will become a means for trade officials to force competition officials to assist in 
opening markets, thus, making the primary focus of competition officials i.e. economic 
efficiency, a mere subsidiary focus to the promotion of importing and exporting.362  
However, this is precisely why developing country participation must be endorsed. By shying 
away from international competition discussions for fear of being overshadowed, developing 
countries are already excluding themselves from the table. And there is no guarantee that 
developed countries will cease to participate without the input of developing countries, thus, 
increasing the possibility of an agreement being implemented without the needs of developing 
countries being accounted for. Thus, whilst the bargaining power might be unequal, the little 
power bestowed on developing countries should still be utilised to ensure that any competition 
policies developed not only support a liberal trade and investment regime, but also take into 
account the distinctive needs of developing countries, and ensure any laws developed are, in 
fact, actionable.363 As pointed out by Pradeep Gaur in Call for a Multilateral Competition 
Regime, whilst individual countries- especially those with smaller economies- might be unable 
to deal with cross-border competition infringement, but collectively their concerns might be 
better valued.364 Ultimately, for a competition regime to be beneficial to developing countries, 
it must not be directed to accessing and opening markets- that is the work of trade policies, 
and whilst competition should be in line with trade, it would make no sense for it to cover the 
same ambit. Instead, any policies developed must be welfare enhancing.  
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5.4.2 The concerns of developed countries  
It is not only developing countries offering resistance where an integrated international 
competition policy is concerned. Whilst their reasons might differ, developed countries, such 
as the United States and European Union countries, are also reluctant to engage in 
discussions about an international competition regime, as evidenced in the discussion of 
chapter 3. The USA, in particular, has benefitted radically from the boost in international trade. 
Given this boost, there has been a need to develop state and federal competition laws to 
account for risks posed by cross-border activity, including mergers, joint ventures, imports and 
exports, is that the interests of consumers and businesses alike are affected by international 
activity. However, this development seems to be confined to the best interests of their own 
country, as opposed to what is universally best. The basis of development appears to be the 
desire to relax competition principles in order to ensure domestic firms have better success 
internationally.365  
However, this notion is rejected by Michael Porter who attributes success to competitive 
relations, both domestically and internationally, and that efforts to relax competition laws only 
ends up undermining it.366 Thus, competition should not be stifled, but rather encouraged yet 
monitored and regulated. In fact, he contests that limiting competition might provide short term 
gains, but pursuing this approach “[…] will virtually guarantee that [nations] never achieve real 
and sustainable competitive advantage”.367 The research found that the USA’s weariness 
about developing an international competition regime on the basis that it will have the effect 
of stifling competition is misguided and the approach of allowing firms to continue practices 
with limited regulation in terms of competition holds no longevity. The USA’s reluctance seems 
to be driven by the desires of leading business firms.368  
As explained in chapter 3, while the EU advocates for the implementation of an international 
competition policy, it is also not without its difficulties. The EU appears to only desire a policy 
that mirrors their own domestic policies. For this reason, the two major superpowers are at 
odds about negotiations. The EU has succeeded in getting the USA to appreciate that 
unregulated competitive practices only poses risks to their major industries, however, the USA 
is not prepared to concede to a policy that they believe does not best fit their needs. 
Unfortunately, without the cooperation of two major countries, it is difficult to get any 
negotiations underway. In addition, in their opposing approaches, it appears as if both the 
                                                          
365 R Pitofsky ‘The Effect of Global Trade on United States Competition Law and Enforcement 
Policies’ available at https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1999/10/effect-global-trade-united-states-
competition-law-and-enforcement-policies, accessed on 01 July 2019. 
366 R Pitofsky (note 365 above). 
367 M Porter (note 38 above; 3 – 4).  
368 G Hufbauer and J Kim (note 343; 330). 
73 
 
USA and the EU have disregarded that developing countries would not be agreeable to a 
policy with either of their preferred models.369 
Overall, the apprehension of developed and developing countries alike is that the difficulty in 
synchronizing differing national policies to form a single standard is too tedious to undertake. 
The commonality between nations is the desire for efficiency and fairness for their domestic 
markets when interacting with international territories. However, while developing countries 
favour a policy focused on welfare gains, developed countries seem to prefer one that is driven 
by a market access agenda.370 
 
5.5 INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION AND SOUTH AFRICA – THE ‘PROUDLY SOUTH 
AFRICAN’ CAMPAIGN  
Like its African peers, South Africa appears to be faced with a conundrum. Having experienced 
the effects of being ostracised from the international community, South Africa has reinforced 
its commitment to international trade obligations, as a means of improving the country’s 
economy. However, the price to pay for such commitment is an increase in competition and 
the risk of exposure to anti-competitive practices from other territories. To negate this effect, 
South Africa has taken strides to ensure its national competition authority and policy is 
advanced. However, without support from the international competition, the effect is limited. 
In addition, South Africa’s involvement in bilateral competition agreements is also limited 
because they rely on the goodwill of their signatories of the application of the provisions, rather 
than enforcing commitment to the obligations.  Its numerous bilateral competition agreements 
are also very limited in application and success because they operate in a cooperative fashion. 
This means that cooperative agreements are unstable and uncertain in effect.  
The ‘Proudly South African’ campaign is well-intentioned, but the risk is that campaign is, in 
fact, in conflict with South Africa’s National Treatment Policy obligation in terms of Article III of 
the GATT. Without certainty of international cooperation in regards to anti-competitive 
behaviour, it might not be the most opportune moment to be excluded from the international 
trade community. But if one of the major sources of threat is international trade itself, where 
does that leave South Africa? 
 
 
                                                          
369 G Hufbauer and J Kim (note 343; 330). 
370 G Hufbauer and J Kim (note 343; 330). 
74 
 
5.6 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The research found that bilateral co-operation agreements can facilitate overall discussions 
and negotiations, but it is preferred that they play an intermediary role only. Thus, it is 
recommended that their role should be to provide at least some form of co-operative 
governance until a consolidated international competition policy is drafted and implemented. 
Whilst the OECD and UNCTAD are not bilateral co-operative agreements, they play a similar 
role in that the application of their recommendations is based on co-operation as opposed to 
mandated regulation. Thus, their success is limited. Because their recommendations are not 
Acts or formal policies, they have no legal implications and only serve as guidelines- 
application relies on moral obligation.371 However, their role as guidelines can be further 
beneficial. When discussing an international model, countries can look to these 
recommendations to elicit what has, in the past, been met with success and what has been 
criticised or objected. Thus, bilateral co-operative agreements, the OECD and UNCTAD 
recommendations can lay the foundation for what will ultimately form global co-operation.  
The WTO faces much criticism where both trade and competition is concerned. In specific 
reference to competition, the view is that the organisation should focus more energy on 
improving the lapses in international trade regulation and that competition is not its field of 
expertise.372 It is for this reason that it is recommended that the role of the WTO should be 
limited, so as not to deter participation in negotiations for the implementation of an international 
competition policy.373 This is not to say that the WTO should play no role in developing an 
international competition policy. Throughout the research, has emphasised that there is no 
denying that trade and competition are interlinked, thus, to wholly exclude the WTO would be 
problematic, especially if the resultant policy is in direct contrast with what the WTO dictates. 
Therefore, whilst the WTO should not be the driver in developing a competition policy, it can 
and should still play an advisory role. Given the success of the organisation in garnering 
international membership, it can be used as a model of how to negotiate and finalize a policy 
amongst so many nations.374  
Finally, another reason WTO involvement should be limited is because, while the aim should 
be for a competition and a trade policy to correspond, unlike trade, competition must be 
concerned with welfare and efficiency rather than market access. Thus, to have a competition 
policy drafted outside the auspice of the WTO can ensure that any WTO provisions that are 
too stringent can be countered by competitive regulations. This is not to say that countries can 
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establish an outlet that will allow them to evade their trade obligations, but rather that WTO 
obligations which are too burdensome- especially for developing countries- can have their 
effects mitigated, where necessitated. This is discussed in direct relation to the Proudly South 
Africa campaign, a the focal point of the research, that is potentially contrary to the country’s 
obligation in terms of the GATT’s national treatment principle. As identified in chapter 3, there 
is no leading panel decisions that indicates whether or not South Africa is, in fact, at fault; 
however, should it be decided that SA’s campaign is in contradiction with what the WTO 
mandates, it will serve our country well to have an international policy, with the same authority 
and effect of the WTO Agreements, that provides a basis for promoting, rather than stifling, 
competition.  Thus, it is essential for an international competition policy to be developed, not 
only to monitor and regulate anti-competitive practices, but also to ensure that the alternative 
is not hindering fair competitive practices, as warned of by Porter.375 
To dispel these concerns, developed country participation is pivotal. This is difficult given the 
mistrust harboured by developing countries. But the reality is that, for a competitive regime to 
have any effect, it cannot simply be drafted to the benefit of developed countries, with 
developing countries being compliant, but with all key players being in accord.376 Thus, whilst 
the WTO should not, in my view, act as principal proxy, lessons can be derived from the 
organisation. In particular, countries should attempt to remedy the approach of developing 
country exclusion and instead ensure developing countries are not only part of the discussion, 
but that their contributions are accounted for. The reality is that developed countries have an 
interest in protecting the market of developing countries for continued access and investment, 
and developing countries cannot achieve much success in the implementation of any regime 
without developed country resources and support.377  
As discussed in Chapter 2, one of the inherent requirements of a successful international 
competition policy is flexibility, much like in the WTO agreements. The reality is that a “one 
size fits all” approach will not prove to be successful due to the difference in needs between 
countries, especially the difference between developed and developing countries. In this 
regard, the socio-economic needs and available resources of developing countries will be 
accounted for.378  
Unfortunately, developing countries are reliant on foreign investment in order to advance. 
Optimistically, these countries will grow to become self-sufficient, but until such a time as that 
occurs, developed countries will have to shoulder the burden of providing aid to ensure 
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continued developing country participation in international trade and competition. If this 
support is not provided, it is most likely that developing countries will feel the pressure to 
protect their industries from foreign competition.379 Flexibility might take the form of resource 
and financial aid, as well as allowing certain exemptions for developing countries, where it can 
be foreseen that compelled participation will be more harmful than beneficial to their 
developmental needs.380 Where it is not feasible to allow a complete mitigation of developing 
country obligations, another alternative could be allowing for different compliance periods. In 
other words, developing countries can be allowed an extension of time within which to 
introduce any international competition policy into their own domestic laws.381 It will better 
serve all countries if the different economies are examined to determine what impact certain 
competition provisions will have on each.  
 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
Essentially, it is a matter of time before the cracks of lack of regulation, where competition is 
concerned, begin to show. As the international trade industry expands, the global effect of 
competition increases its reach too. It is for this reason that simply adopting national 
competition policies will not suffice for long.  
Because an international competition policy is deemed by many an impossible feat to achieve, 
bilateral cooperative agreements appear to be an alternative. However, in my view, these will 
merely serve as a temporary measure. The usefulness of countries signing bilateral 
agreements for competition is that they can act as a guideline for the development of any 
future international agreement. However, the issue of lack of enforcement and regulatory 
overlap proves the agreements are of very little use in achieving multilateral harmony.  
A key concern is that any international competition agreement must account for the needs of 
developing countries. One of the major criticisms of WTO involvement in the development of 
an international competition policy is that the WTO has become an organ of developed country 
needs. Any international competition policy developed must not only avoid doing the same, 
but must also ensure that its requirements are not so cumbersome on developing countries 
that, rather than working as a measure to boost their economies, it stifles their development 
objectives by exposing developing countries to more competition than it is capable of handling.  
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The Proudly South African campaign is an example of the above. If interpreted strictly, the 
reality is that the campaign does not appear to comply with the standards endorsed by the 
WTO in its National Treatment Policy. However, if effected correctly, the campaign can stand 
to strengthen the country’s economy in many respects. Thus, any international competition 
policy must consider the developmental needs of smaller economies and refrain from effecting 
blanket obligations that developed countries might be able to withstand, but which will 
adversely affect developing countries. Anti-competitive behaviour must be controlled and 
restrained, but stakeholders must be weary of restricting healthy competitive practices in turn. 
In other words, an organisation representing the development of international competition 
regulation will not fare well if it operates under the umbrella of the WTO. Whilst trade and 
competition are irrefutably connected, they are not one and the same, and competition must 
not be used as a means of further promoting market access whilst limiting economic 
development.  
It is undeniable that a national competition policy is a mammoth task but, like the WTO and 
GATT before it, what once seemed impossible has now been achieved, albeit with certain 
faults. Thus, competition will realistically need to be broached in a piece meal fashion, but the 
overall objection should remain national compliance.  
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